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THE “TRUE MAN” AND HIS GUN: ON THE MASCULINE
MYSTIQUE OF SECOND AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE
C.D. CHRISTENSEN*
The Supreme Court’s recent Second Amendment jurisprudence
raises serious normative questions for the use of self-defense with
a firearm. This jurisprudence also implicates our prevailing social
norms with respect to socially constructed and structurally perva-
sive gender roles. I argue that a peculiarly American conception of
masculinity underpins the judicial construction of the Second Amend-
ment’s core purpose as guaranteeing the right to armed defense of
one’s self and one’s home. The Court’s recent Second Amendment
rulings create an individual protection for gun ownership and incor-
porate the same against the States. But the Court’s reasoning
entangles this protection with an implicit valuation of manhood that
reifies the notion that “true men” do not retreat in the face of danger.
In so entangling, the Court establishes a right to gun ownership that
is politically free but legally male. This Article explores the socio-legal
structures that underpin the Court’s reasoning to explain (a) how
the right to keep and bear arms arises from a dubious ideal of the
American “man,” and thus how (b) the purposes for which one may
keep and bear arms galvanizes a particular masculine type within our
Second Amendment jurisprudence. That type establishes a prob-
lematic cultural narrative of and ethos for manhood in America; con-
sequently, this jurisprudence establishes a dominant masculinity
predicated upon firearm ownership. That masculinity complicates,
and may even impede, the social evolution of subordinated mascu-
linities and shifts the social hierarchy of masculinities to empower
and privilege gun-owning males.
INTRODUCTION
I. HELLER AND THE CASTLE DOCTRINE
A. Our Homes Ourselves
B. Necessity and Proportionality in Heller
C. A Man’s Gun Is His Castle?
D. The Castle Doctrine and the “True Man”
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II. HELLER’S CONSTITUTIONAL NARRATIVE: A MASCULINE
MYSTIQUE
A. Second Amendment as Hegemonic Masculinity
B. The Illusion of a Feminist Second Amendment
C. Heller’s Art of Manliness
1. Navigating Heller’s Paradox
2. Ethos and Legal Performance




In the year since Justice Scalia’s death, the political stakes of
the Second Amendment have shifted dramatically. On the one hand,
lower courts continue to disagree over whether the Amendment pro-
tects a right to carry firearms in public.1 This is nothing new. Even
with Scalia’s presence the Court had refused to consider the question.2
On the other hand, the Second Amendment is in imminent peril, with
some going so far as to postulate that the Amendment is in danger
of “being written out of the constitution [sic] altogether.” 3 Tellingly,
both hands are raised by advocates for expansive gun rights.4 Yet,
the dichotomy is stark: marginal expansion or wholesale liquidation.
Neither outcome is very likely, and each tender more political
currency than legal import; for better or for worse, the Second
1. See Peruta v. City of San Diego, No. 10-56971, at *11 (9th Cir. June 9, 2016)
(holding that the Second Amendment “does not preserve or protect a right of a member
of the general public to carry concealed f irearms in public.”); Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d
933, 936 (7th Cir. 2012) (holding the Second Amendment “implies a right to carry a loaded
gun outside the home.”).
2. See Friedman v. City of Highland Park, 136 S. Ct. 447, cert. denied (No. 15-133)
(Thomas, J., dissenting); Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Won’t Hear Challenge to Assault
Weapons Ban in Chicago Suburb, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 7, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com
/2015/12/08/us/supreme-court-will-not-hear-challenge-to-assault-weapons-ban-of-highland
-park-ill.html [https://perma.cc/9Y54VQ3K].
3. Matt Flegenheimer, The Death of Justice Scalia: Reactions and Analysis, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 14, 2016, 11:19 AM) (quoting Ted Cruz), https://www.nytimes.com/live/supreme
-court-justice-antonin-scalia-dies-at-79 [https://perma.cc/2S87QTUZ].
4. Curiously, both sides of the American gun control debate might sign on to the first
side of this ledger. The disagreement over the Second Amendment’s applicability in the
public domain is one raised by each, with gun control proponents attempting to restrict
access to specif ic types of f irearms and the places where they may be carried, and gun
rights advocates wishing to expand the same. Yet, gun control advocates are not those
crying out that American gun rights are in danger. Put differently, the same camp that
wishes to expand Second Amendment protections fears their disappearance, while the
camp that wishes to restrict Second Amendment protections has resolved itself that the
Second Amendment, for better or for worse, is here to stay.
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Amendment isn’t going anywhere.5 But perhaps the same set of social
forces motivates both sides of this dichotomy. Here, I want to sug-
gest that both the battle for a more expansive Second Amendment and
the fear of its disappearance share a cultural valuation of manhood
that ignites an intense anxiety within the gun-owning class of Ameri-
can men over their masculine identities. To understand better what
is at stake when we talk about the future of the Second Amendment
in a world without Scalia, we would therefore do well to pay careful
attention to the cultural values and social forces underpinning the
language of his crowning jurisprudential achievement, District of
Columbia v. Heller.6 Indeed, if the Second Amendment’s constitu-
tional moorings, as best we can tell, remain secure, then the vulnera-
bility that this dichotomy expresses must be animated by something
else. To unearth these, I would like to begin by way of illustration
with a case that, on its face, has nothing to do with Heller, and return
for my starting point to a small courthouse in Shenandoah County,
Virginia. Consider the trial of Commonwealth v. Jody Bradley.7
Its fact pattern is as striking as it is perverse. On the evening
of January 6, 2009, Jody Lynn Bradley, a forty-eight-year-old white
male, shot and killed Brendon Manning Barker, an unarmed sixteen-
year-old white youth, in the attic of Bradley’s Virginia farm house.8
Although the circumstances leading to Mr. Bradley’s decision
to shoot and kill Barker remain disputed, Mr. Bradley’s attorney
contended that he did not approve of Barker’s relationship with his
daughter, Sarah, and on several occasions forbade Barker to see
her.9 He went as far as to warn Barker explicitly that he would shoot
him if he were ever found with his daughter or on his property.10
5. See Joseph Blocher, Scalia’s Gun Rights Legacy is Likely to Stand, No Matter
Who Replaces Him, THE TRACE (Feb. 15, 2016), https://www.thetrace.org/2016/02/antonin
-scalia-legacy-gun-rights/ [https://perma.cc/5ULZ4TV5] (noting that “the primary ob-
stacles to stronger gun laws remain political, not constitutional”). The same strategy of
investing substantial rhetorical and political capital into what promises to amount to other-
wise insubstantial legal and practical change is evident amongst those favoring stricter
gun control as well, see Franklin E. Zimring, Continuity and Change in the American Gun
Debate, in GUNS, CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 29, 33 (Bernard E. Harcourt, ed.,
2003) (arguing that gun control proponents “couple small operational changes with the
full weight of f irearms control symbolism”).
6. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
7. Virginia v. Bradley (Shenandoah Cty. Ct. 2009) (CR09000122-00).
8. Charges Against Bradley Heading to Grand Jury, WHSV NEWS (Mar. 20, 2009),
http://www.whsv.com/home/headlines/41517862.html [https://perma.cc/2PT4ACMP];
Man Arrested for Killing Daughter’s Boyfriend, WHSV NEWS (Jan. 9, 2009), http://www
.whsv.com/home/headlines/37212929.html [https://perma.cc/2YB9TEWZ]; The Bradley
Verdict, N. VA. DAILY (Aug. 24, 2009), http://www.nvdaily.com/opinion/2009/08/the-brad
ley-verdict [https://perma.cc/BSE2TX7S].
9. See The Bradley Verdict, supra note 8, at 1.
10. Sally Voth, Mother of slain teen won’t rest on her conviction that the killer’s
punishment didn’t f it the crime, N. VA. DAILY (Nov. 20, 2009), http://www.nvdaily.com
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Returning home on January 6th unable to find Sarah, and sus-
pecting that someone might be in the attic, Mr. Bradley placed an
object in front of the attic door, and then walked downstairs to retrieve
a .38 caliber revolver and a flashlight.11 Mr. Bradley then proceeded
to the attic, pushing past his daughter, and fired one shot.12
Brendon Manning Barker lay defenseless on his back when he
was shot once in the head from two feet away by his girlfriend’s
father.13
Facing a first-degree murder charge, Mr. Bradley’s defense in-
voked the protection of the Castle Doctrine, a common law doctrine
of self-defense that authorizes the use of force to defend (a) one’s self
and (b) one’s home.14 The common law recognizes each of these
principles as an affirmative defense against prosecution for the use
of force; together they allow a home dweller to use deadly force
upon a home intruder and they abrogate the home dweller’s duty to
retreat.15
In the context of this Castle Doctrine defense, Mr. Bradley’s
defense submitted to the jury in closing arguments:
You all got to see and hear from Jody Bradley. I think you can tell,
he is not a complicated guy. A pretty simple guy. He is out there
running a farm, on his own. [But] he is trying to deal with some-
thing that is overwhelming, and he is just not capable of dealing
with it.16
Citing previous occasions Barker had been secretly visiting Sarah,
the defense argued further:
Six to eight times he [Mr. Bradley] calls law enforcement. . .
Jody Bradley does what. . . follows the path that he, in his frus-
tration, has been told to follow. ‘I can’t cope with it. It’s frustrat-
ing. It’s making me angry. I don’t know how to stop it. My
/news/2009/11/mother-of-slain-teen-wont-rest-on-her-conviction-that-the-killers-punish
ment-didnt-f it-the-crime/ [https://perma.cc/UZ6HGBWX].
11. See The Bradley Verdict, supra note 8, at 1.
12. Id.
13. See Man Arrested for Killing Daughter’s Boyfriend, supra note 8, at 1.
14. Denise Paquette Boots, Jayshree Bihari, & Euel Elliot, The State of the Castle:
An Overview of Recent Trends in State Castle Doctrine Legislation and Public Policy, 34
CRIM. JUST. REV. 515, 516 (2009) (citing Daniel Michael, Florida’s Protection of Persons
Bill, 43 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 199 (2006)).
15. Id.
16. Transcript of Closing Arguments at 521–31, Virginia v. Bradley (Shenandoah
Cty. Ct. 2009) (CR09000122-00).
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daughter is heading down a path of destruction. I don’t know
how to stop it.’ . . .
[T]his time he has found him on the property. On his property. . .
[A]nd now we hear, at night, Jody Bradley back in the house
from work. It’s dark out. He doesn’t know where his daughter is.
She is not answering his calls. He sees that there is somebody in
the attic. He puts a hamper there, so he will know if somebody
comes out. He thinks there is an intruder. It might be Sarah. It
might be somebody else. He clearly has some idea that maybe
it’s Sarah, with somebody who is not supposed to be there. He
decides what to do. . . .17
The defense’s narrative continues, framing Mr. Bradley’s thought
process:
I am in my house. I’ve got somebody unknown in my house.
Maybe with my daughter. It may not be with my daughter. I
don’t know.’ He arms himself to go up to his own attic. He gets
his own gun, from his own house, to go into another part of his
own house. Is that evil? Is that logical? Is that just human? It’s
pretty human.
He goes upstairs. And he finds Sarah. He is looking around.
‘I’m looking around. I’m thinking maybe it’s Brendon up here.
Maybe it’s somebody up here.’
What happens there is Jody Bradley being in a place he is al-
lowed to be, his own home, at night, with a hooded figure crouched
down in his attic, at night, hiding himself in a location he has
been barred by law from being. . . Without thinking, Jody fires
the one shot.18
In light of this narrative, Mr. Bradley’s attorney offered as a final
defense:
This is clearly not a murder case. . . . Because I submit to you,
there is this level of frustration, this anger that he has tried to
get fixed, this problem between these. . . his daughter and this
boy, that he has tried over and over and over, without success,
to get help with and to stop.
[I]f this was malice, it wouldn’t have been one shot. It was
one shot. He sees the boy go down. He sees, and it is obvious to
17. Id.
18. Id.
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him, that the boy is deceased. . . That shot is not fired with
malice. What it is, it is not fired with malice, if it is fired with
anything, it is fired with love for his daughter.
. . . There is no question that that frustration and that
anger, that inability to solve this difficulty, to save his daughter,
is what motivates this. This is not willful and premeditated. It
is a tragedy all the way around.19
The rhetorical devices that Mr. Bradley’s defense employed to
frame the killing of an unarmed youth are not unique. Indeed, the
discourse through which the jury was prompted to interpret Mr.
Bradley’s actions implicates the all too common narrative of self-
defense and justifiable deadly force that has inundated national
news media and haunted the American psyche as killings not unlike
Barker’s gather widespread attention. From the killings of unarmed
black youths, from Trayvon Martin and Jordan Davis at the hands
of private citizens, to that of Michael Brown at the hands of public
officers of law, this narrative raises a host of social, political and legal
issues.20 Together they demonstrate the contemporary departure from
historical common law doctrines of self-defense, systemic racial stereo-
typing, and the peculiar association between firearm ownership,
self-defense, and masculinity with which this Article grapples.21
Though each of these killings is circumstantially distinct, be-
neath their discontinuities each is rooted firmly in a narrative that
reflects an ethos of manhood. Put a different way, they are united by
a conception of masculinity that links male agency and self-defense
with a firearm.22 That the firearm is both a tool and a phallus is old
19. Id.
20. For a discussion of these implications from a criminological perspective, see Boots
et al., supra note 14, at 524–30; Anna Marie Smith, Deadly Force and Public Reason,
Theory & Event 15, no. 3 (2012), https://muse.jhu.edu/ (accessed Feb. 15, 2017) (arguing
that narratives like this, and the legal armature that conducts them, manifest “what we
are supposed to collectively value, to whom we are required to show respect, what ends we
are encouraged to regard as our most weighty social priorities, which crimes deserve the
full glare of our public attention, and which crimes ought to be left in the shade.”).
21. See, e.g., Frank Rudy Cooper, “Who’s the Man?”: Masculinities Studies, Terry Stops,
and Police Training, 18 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 617, 674 (2009) (“Male police officers may
sometimes be tempted to turn encounters with male civilians into masculinity contests.”);
Myisha Cherry, The Police and Their Masculinity Problem, THE HUFFINGTON POST
(Nov. 26, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/myisha-cherry/the-police-and-their-masc
_b_6225834.html [https://perma.cc/BJS532WS] (“Officer Darren Wilson’s account of the
shooting of Michael Brown sounds not only like a Western film . . . but a Western f ilm
entrenched in masculinity discourse.”).
22. To be sure, each of these cases retains important factual distinctions that com-
plicate the promise for a harmonious legal analysis. For instance, that Barker was a white
male in the rural south does not implicate the racial factors deeply embedded within the
Martin, Davis, and Brown killings.
2017] THE “TRUE MAN” AND HIS GUN 483
hat, but at levels both symbolic and practical the defense of gun
ownership, and more importantly, the defense of one’s “lawful”
actions with a gun, is a defense of a particularly masculine ideology.23
In this regard, the association between gun ownership and mascu-
linity enjoys a rich sociological literature.24 But scarce work exam-
ines the extent to which the legal apparatus that forms the core of
this association, namely, the Second Amendment, perpetuates this
linkage and the social meanings attached to it.25
At first glance, Mr. Bradley’s case does not meaningfully implicate
the Second Amendment. Indeed, the defense does not make any claims
regarding his right to firearm ownership. Rather, this right is pre-
supposed. The defense instead claims that Mr. Bradley had a right to
use force—even deadly force—to defend himself, his daughter, and
his home.26 If anything, the firearm is merely the tool with which
Mr. Bradley exercised this broader right. But Mr. Bradley’s invocation
of and narrative for his Castle defense implicates the underlying ra-
tionale and effect of the Court’s justification for the Second Amend-
ment’s right to individual firearm ownership.27 The rhetoric of Mr.
Bradley’s defense thus serves as an instructive starting point for two
reasons. First, it animates the common law rationale of self-defense
within the home upon which the Court has constructed a constitu-
tional right to gun ownership. Second, it highlights the cultural
23. R.W. CONNELL, MASCULINITIES 212 (1995).
24. See, e.g., JENNIFER CARLSON, CITIZEN-PROTECTORS: THE EVERYDAY POLITICS OF
GUNS IN AN AGE OF DECLINE 135 (2015); SCOTT MELZER, GUN CRUSADERS: THE NRA’S
CULTURE WAR 133 (2009); Kevin Lewis O’Neill, Armed Citizens and the Stories They
Tell: The National Rifle Association’s Achievement of Terror and Masculinity, 9 MEN &
MASCULINITIES 457–58 (2007); Angela Stroud, Good Guys With Guns: Hegemonic Mas-
culinity and Concealed Handguns, 26 GENDER & SOC’Y 216, 216 (2012).
25. The social meanings assigned to gun ownership, and the Second Amendment
specifically, have been examined on both ideological and racial registers. See Dan Kahan,
The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 HARV. L. REV. 413, 453 (1999) (discussing the com-
peting social meanings and cultural identities bound up in debates over gun rights);
Maxine Burkett, Much Ado About. . . Something Else: D.C. v. Heller, the Racialized
Mythology of the Second Amendment, 12 J. GENDER, RACE & JUST. 57, 58 (2008) (“The
cultural mythology that undergirds the commitment to the right to bear arms has long
gained force from and been perpetuated by a perennial struggle between white and black
America.”). My analysis of the Second Amendment’s masculinity problem does not offer
an alternative account of the amendment’s cultural mythology; rather, it offers a con-
comitant one. To be sure, masculinity, and gender more generally, is tethered inextricably
to a complex matrix of social relations—including and perhaps especially race—and their
constructed meanings intersect and often compound one another. With this in mind,
readers might well ponder the account of masculinity offered herewith as one perhaps
peculiar to the white identity, though not necessarily limited to it.
26. See supra note 16.
27. See infra Part II ( laying out how Heller decision mirrors the legal armature of the
Castle Doctrine).
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norms associated with and evoked by the role of men in the preser-
vation of the familial hearth.28
The relatively recent decisions of District of Columbia v. Heller
and McDonald v. City of Chicago together establish that the Second
Amendment right to keep and bear arms exists for the individual
purpose of self-defense, and consequently, has given rise to the rea-
sonable expectation that gun control issues that have remained
relatively dormant in recent political debate will become increasingly
accommodating to the pro-gun agenda.29 So, too, these decisions have
supplied the fodder for statutory innovations accommodating the
justified use of self-defense with a firearm, namely through the ex-
pansion of the Castle Doctrine and the rise of controversial Stand
Your Ground laws.30 Because the Court relies overwhelmingly upon
the understanding of self-defense in the common law tradition in order
to demonstrate historical evidence for a purported right to self-defense
in their construction of the Second Amendment, it has left open a
doorway through which statutes conventionally associated with the
common law might now be understood as constitutional authority.31
The practical implications of the holdings in both Heller and
McDonald are widely discussed within both academic and political
spheres. If nothing else, Heller and McDonald reinvigorated the
contemporary political conversation about the legitimacy, desirabil-
ity, and importance of personal firearms for purposes of self-defense.32
28. According to a 2013 study by the Pew Research Center, 48% of respondents in a
national survey answered that “protection” is their primary reason for owning a gun.
This is a dramatic departure from a 1999 study administered with the Washington Post,
which found that only 26% of respondents owned a gun for “protection.” See Why Own
a Gun? Protection Is Now Top Reason, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Mar. 12, 2013), http://www
.people-press.org/2013/03/12/why-own-a-gun-protection-is-now-top-reason [http://perma
.cc/K9DLZB8C].
29. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 742 (2010) (incorporating Heller ’s
central holding against the individual states); District of Columbia v. Heller, 544 U.S.
570, 570 (2008); Michael P. O’Shea, Modeling the Second Amendment Right to Carry
Arms (I): Judicial Tradition and the Scope of “Bearing Arms” for Self-Defense, 61 AM. U.
L. REV. 585, 587–88 (2012); Boots et al., supra note 14, at 517.
30. See, e.g., Boots et al., supra note 14, at 524 (f inding that “23 of the 50 states have
enacted expanded castle doctrine legislation from 2005 through December 2008”); P.
Luevonda Ross, The Transmogrification of Self-Defense by National Rifle Association
Statutes, 35 S.U. L. REV. 1 (2007); Daniel Sweeney, Note, Standing Up to “Stand Your
Ground” Laws: How the Modern NRA-Inspired Self-Defense Statutes Destroy the Principle
of Necessity, Disrupt the Criminal Justice System, and Increase Overall Violence, 64
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 715, 738 (2016) (discussing the politics of “Stand Your Ground”).
31. Reva B. Siegel, Heller & Originalism’s Dead Hand—In Theory and Practice, 56
UCLA L. REV. 1399, 1400, 1413 (2009).
32. Akhil Reed Amar, When legal bullets bounce back, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Dec. 26,
2012), http://www.nydailynews.com/opinion/legal-bullets-bounce-back-article-1.1225737
[http://perma.cc/FKL6XXWQ] (noting how the Heller decision reignited a dormant legal
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In raising these questions, Heller and McDonald also ignited a de-
bate about the legal background of the Second Amendment and the
presumed foundation of the Court’s construction of a constitutional
right guaranteeing armed self-defense.33 That debate has focused
largely on areas that touch on Heller’s and McDonald ’s implications
for legal provisions concerning rights to carry firearms in public, the
relationship between citizenship rights and the Second Amendment,
and the ramifications of incorporating the Second Amendment upon
the individual states.34 The definitive commonality within the post
Heller-McDonald Second Amendment scholarship is the recognition
of the Court’s unambiguous association between the common law
conception of self-defense and firearm ownership.35 This association
leads some to argue that Heller effectively constitutionalized a right
to self-defense.36 However, the social and philosophical underpinnings
of Heller’s reasoning suggest that the Second Amendment codifies
a specific kind of legal self-defense, namely the Castle Doctrine.
The purpose of this Article is thus twofold. First, it reexamines
the association between firearm ownership and self-defense with an
acute focus on the relationship between the underlying legal princi-
ples in Heller and those of the Castle Doctrine. Further, it suggests
that the reasoning the majority employed in Heller, and again em-
braced in McDonald, creates a fundamental kinship between the
Second Amendment and the Castle Doctrine. This kinship estab-
lishes a peculiar constitutional linkage between justifiable uses of
self-defense within one’s home, often defined by state statutes, and
the Second Amendment—so long as the self-defense is carried out
with a firearm.
The second purpose of this Article is to excavate the historical,
cultural, and political ideologies underpinning the Castle Doctrine,
and consequently imbued within the Second Amendment, to bring
to the fore the valuation of the “true man” contained therein. To this
point, I argue that the Court entangles the Second Amendment with
the Castle Doctrine’s implicit valuation of manhood, which reifies
doctrine and offered important legal “ammunition” for both political liberals and political
conservatives alike).
33. See Jonathan Meltzer, Open Carry for All: Heller and Our Nineteenth-Century
Second Amendment, 123 YALE L. J. 1486, 1492–93 (2014).
34. See O’Shea, supra note 29, at 587–89; Joseph Blocher, Rights To and Not To, 100
CALIF. L. REV. 761, 763 (2012); Joseph Blocher, Reverse Incorporation of State Con-
stitutional Law, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 323, 380–82 (2011); Pratheepan Gulasekaram, “The
People” of the Second Amendment: Citizenship and the Right to Bear Arms, 85 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1521, 1523 (2010).
35. See, e.g., Gulasekaram, supra note 34, at 1528.
36. See Siegel, supra note 31, at 1415; Gulasekaram, supra note 34, at 1522.
486 WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW           [  V    o l. 23:477
the notion that “true men” do not retreat in the face of danger. In so
entangling, the Court establishes an association between the per-
ceptions of—and responses to—vulnerability and the legitimate use
of force. This association fetishizes the firearm as both a tool of
defense and as a manifestation of a particular masculine ideology.
Heller thus allows for an interpretation of the Second Amendment
that constitutionally galvanizes a particular masculine typology, and
that carves out a dominant masculinity predicated upon firearm
ownership within our public reason. This interpretation complicates
the social evolution of subordinated masculinities, and is central to
the performance of gendered identities more generally.
This Article proceeds in three Parts. Part I addresses the judi-
cial construction of the Second Amendment in Heller and McDonald,
and specifically engages how the Court’s reasoning embraces an
association between self-defense and gun ownership that mirrors
the underlying rationale and practical effect of the common law
understanding of the Castle Doctrine. Further, this Part examines
the Castle Doctrine’s historical infatuation with manhood and raises
important concerns for a constitutional right that is predicated on
implicit social mandates for masculine conduct.
Part II examines the “true man” ideology that informs Heller’s
controlling language and confronts it as a cultural narrative of and
ethos for masculinity in America. Arguing that constitutional values
exist as dominant social facts within our public consciousness, this
Part suggests that Heller and McDonald shift the social hierarchy
of masculinities in a way that empowers and privileges gun-owning
men. By situating a masculine typology within the context of the
Second Amendment, these decisions reify problematic conceptions
of American manhood and embed the same within the physical posses-
sion and use of the firearm. This Part considers further the promise,
if any, of a feminist argument for the Second Amendment, and argues
that Heller’s apparent contradictions generate an illusory freedom
that is politically free in theory but legally male in practice.
Finally, Part III concludes by suggesting that the processes of
social transformation by which conceptions of masculinity are de-
fined and redefined are constricted by the Second Amendment’s
place within our public reason, and thus by the act of gun owning.
I. HELLER AND THE CASTLE DOCTRINE
District of Columbia v. Heller marks the first case in nearly
seventy years in which the Court directly examined the Second
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Amendment’s central meaning.37 The case challenged the District of
Columbia’s prohibition on privately owned handguns, under which
D.C. residents were required to obtain a special license from the
D.C. chief of police to possess a handgun, and that required all pri-
vately owned firearms to be kept unloaded, disassembled, or trigger-
locked.38 After being denied a license to keep a handgun in his home
for the purpose of self-defense, Dick Heller, a D.C. resident and se-
curity guard, challenged this law on the grounds that the licensing
and trigger-lock requirements violated the Second Amendment.39 In
holding that the Amendment guarantees an individual right to gun
ownership for purposes of self-defense within the home, it is little
wonder why Heller’s otherwise controversial outcome seems so famil-
iar; it at once appeals to America’s obsession with self-defense and
builds legal symmetry with a historical tradition that sanctifies the
security of the home.40 Thus, inasmuch as Heller purports that the
Second Amendment “codified a pre-existing right,” scholars have
located it in the common law understanding of the Castle Doctrine.41
Aside from the common law, this same scholarship contends that
37. Linda Greenhouse, Justices to Decide on Right to Keep Handgun, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 21, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/21/us/21scotus.html?Pagewanted=al
[http://perma.cc/C3SF6WME].
38. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 575 (2008).
39. Id. at 575–76; Robert Barnes, Justices To Rule On D.C. Gun Ban, WASH. POST
(Nov. 21, 2007), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/11/20/AR
2007112000893.html [http://perma.cc/YC3LC6MK].
40. Daniel J. Sharfstein, Atrocity, Entitlement, and Personhood in Property, 98 VA.
L. REV. 635, 639 (2012) (“Judges routinely anticipate that people will resort to deadly
force over even the most picayune trespasses.”). Even the dissenting opinions in Heller
and McDonald acknowledge this point. See McDonald, 561 U.S. at 886 (Stevens J.,
dissenting) (“[O]ur law has long recognized that the home provides a kind of special
sanctuary in modern life.” ).
41. Heller, 554 U.S. at 592 (emphasis removed). See Darrell Miller, Guns As Smut: De-
fending The Home-Bound Second Amendment, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1278, 1350 (2009) (argu-
ing that understanding the Second Amendment as a “narrow form of castle doctrine . . . .
reflects the least historically contested threat that could have animated the right to keep
and bear arms in the f irst place . . . .” ). Though perhaps a clever doctrinal analogy,
Miller’s argument for “guns as smut” dangerously contributes to the same gendered
imbalance built into the Second Amendment that is depicted in much smut itself: male
domination and women subjugation. To be sure, I do not claim that Miller does so in-
tentionally, but his analysis participates in precisely the sort of legal fetishism that
obscures our social realities by prizing the black letter over the lived experience. Above
all else, it is our lived experiences that take precedence in the foregoing analysis; O’Shea,
supra note 29, at 594 (suggesting that the “traditional expression of self-defense law has
been qualif ied by so-called ‘Castle Doctrine’ statutes . . . .” ); Burkett, supra note 25, at
79 (tracing the cultural mythology informing the Second Amendment to a vision of an
armed individual defending his “castle”); Stephen P. Halbrook, Personal Security,
Personal Liberty, and “the Constitutional Right to Bear Arms”: Visions of the Framers
of the Fourteenth Amendment, 5 SETON HALL CONST. L. J. 341, 362 (1995) (quoting
Senator Garrett Davis of Kentucky (1886) suggesting the Framers agreed every man
should bear arms “in his house, his castle, for his own defense.”).
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Heller’s reverence for the protection of the home affirms a recurrent
commitment in “the Bill of Rights as a whole.” 42 Working in chorus
with the Third and Fourth Amendments’ express concerns for the
home, this scholarship suggests a Second Amendment right predi-
cated on home protection “complements a long and durable line of
cases and reaffirms ‘our tradition [that] the State is not omnipres-
ent in the home.’ ” 43
Yet rationalizing Heller’s reading of the Second Amendment,
either by way of established common law, appeals to tradition, or
some greater principle of constitutional congruency, elides the po-
tential implications the association between the firearm and the
home—and particularly the linkages between the Castle Doctrine
and the Second Amendment—have for the criminal law. Perhaps more
critically, accepting as constitutional authority a pre-existing com-
mon law right to self-defense, previously unqualified by a specific
tool of force, underscores a shared tradition at the expense of obscur-
ing problematic practical effects and masking troublesome social
forces. To understand more completely the cultural narrative Heller
relies on and contributes to thus requires that we pay precise atten-
tion to both. Put a different way, we must connect its semiotics with
the legal apparatus designed to provide for “the least historically
contested threat that could have animated the right to keep and
bear arms in the first place”—the Castle Doctrine.44
A. Our Homes Ourselves
By placing the right to self-defense within the home at the heart
of the Second Amendment, Heller entangles two distinct theories of
self-help: defense of habitation and self-defense.45 Together, these
common law protections entitle an individual by natural right to use
force to protect (a) one’s dwelling and (b) one’s body, respectively.46
In combination, the rationale and effect of these two common law
theories constitute the basic formulation of the Castle Doctrine.47
Within the walls of the home, the logic informing the Castle Doctrine
42. Michael C. Dorf, Does Heller Protect a Right to Carry Guns Outside the Home?,
59 SYRACUSE L. REV. 225, 232 (2008); Miller, supra note 41, at 1305.
43. Miller, supra note 41, at 1305 (quoting Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562
(2003)).
44. Id. at 1350.
45. See, e.g., Siegel, supra note 31, at 1420.
46. See, e.g., WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 223
(“[T]he law of England has so particular and tender a regard to the immunity of a man’s
house, that it [considers] it his castle, and will never suffer it to be violated with
impunity . . . .” ).
47. Benjamin Levin, Note, A Defensible Defense?: Reexamining Castle Doctrine
Statutes, 47 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 523, 530 (2010).
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as a positive defense for uses of deadly force that might otherwise
constitute murder “assumes that so many otherwise law-abiding
men and women would use deadly force in such circumstances that
excusing these homicides is necessary to keep the law legitimately
in line with social practice.” 48
To the extent that the Castle Doctrine works to align law with
a tendency towards violence in situations that jeopardize the sanc-
tity of one’s body or one’s property, such alignment functionally
muddles the distinction between the doctrine’s component parts.
Although defense of habitation is properly understood as a right of
property, self-defense is a right of body.49 The former is rooted in the
view that one’s home is one’s castle, and the violation of its sacro-
sanctity is what affords the right to force in its defense.50 The degree
to which the home is violated, however, need not precipitate a threat
of violence to the body for defense of habitation to justify or excuse
the use of deadly force.51 Though it does not apply in cases of mere
trespass, it requires only that force be used to prevent the commis-
sion of any forcible felony within one’s personal dwelling.52 The
latter, on the other hand, maintains that one may meet force with
force in situations that avail themselves of no other immediate solu-
tion.53 Self-defense under the common law provides, and always has
provided, that one has the right to use deadly force in the face of
clear and present danger.54 Although the doctrines of necessity and
proportionality limit this right in the public sphere, a space that
also has historically imposed a duty to retreat, these limitations
have in their turn been abrogated within the private confines of the
home.55 By integrating seamlessly both defenses, the Castle Doctrine
48. Sharfstein, supra note 40, at 639. For an example of how courts carve out such
exceptions to fall in line with social practice, see Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., 563
N.W.2d 154, 161 (Wis. 1997) (“Although dueling is rarely a modern form of self-help, one
can easily imagine a frustrated landowner taking the law into his or her own hands when
faced with a brazen trespasser . . . who refuses to heed no trespass warnings.”).
49. See Levin, supra note 47, at 530.
50. See id.; State v. Carothers, 594 N.W.2d 897, 900 (Minn. 1999) (“Minnesota has
long adhered to the common law recognition of the home’s importance, holding that ‘the
house has a peculiar immunity [in] that it is sacred for the protection of [a person’s]
family.’ ” ) (quoting State v. Touri, 112 N.W. 422, 424 (Minn. 1907)).
51. Sarah Pohlman, Comment, Shooting from the Hip: Missouri’s New Approach to
Defense of Habitation, 56 ST. LOUIS L. J. 857, 859–60 (2012).
52. Id. at 859.
53. Id. at 863.
54. Beard v. United States, 158 U.S. 550, 564 (1895) (holding that one is “entitled to
stand his ground and meet any attack made upon him with a deadly weapon, in such
way and with such force as, under all the circumstances, he, at the moment, honestly
believed, and had reasonable grounds to believe, was necessary to save his own life or
to protect himself from great bodily injury.”).
55. See Pohlman, supra note 51, at 863.
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thus carves out an exception for the use of deadly force in pursuit of
a right to either body or property, conceptually and practically ob-
scuring the distinction between the two.
Not unlike the Castle Doctrine itself, Heller blurs the distinc-
tion between the rationales for self-defense with that of defense of
habitation:
[T]he inherent right of self-defense has been central to the Sec-
ond Amendment right. The handgun ban amounts to a prohibition
of an entire class of “arms” that is overwhelmingly chosen by
American society for that lawful purpose. The prohibition ex-
tends, moreover, to the home, where the need for defense of self,
family, and property is most acute. Under any of the standards
of scrutiny that we have applied to enumerated constitutional
rights, banning from the home “the most preferred firearm in the
nation to ‘keep’ and use for protection of one’s home and family,”
would fail constitutional muster.56
Here, “the inherent right of self-defense,” particularly “for
protection of one’s home,” signals that the right to gun ownership is
protected to satisfy (a) one’s personal safety and (b) one’s propri-
etary interests.57 Simply construing the Second Amendment to
provide an individual right to gun ownership for the purposes of
personal protection in the home would not be beyond the scope of
the long-established doctrine of self-defense. However, construing
the Second Amendment such that it provides a right “for protection
of one’s home” links self-defense and defense of habitation in the
same stroke.58 Importantly, Heller demarcates the Amendment’s
spatial application with the preposition “of,” rather than “in.” 59 To
argue that the Amendment provides for one’s personal protection
“in” the home would do little more than affirm the recognized common
law tradition that one may respond to imminent danger with force,
especially within the personal dwelling, where he who occupies his
home enjoys the privilege of nonretreat.60 But to ground the right in
the protection “of” one’s home speaks to the notion that one may use
force to protect from any array felonious acts, even if non-violent,
which may affect one’s property. Properly understood, Heller’s read-
ing of the Second Amendment thus creates a constitutional right to
56. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628–29 (2008) (emphasis added).
57. Id.
58. Id. (emphasis added).
59. Id.
60. Catherine L. Carpenter, Of the Enemy Within, the Castle Doctrine, and Self-
Defense, 86 MARQ. L. REV. 653, 656 (2003).
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possess a firearm for the purposes of defending both one’s body and
one’s property, whether under threat together or separately.
In the same vein, Heller constitutionally abrogates the duty to
retreat once within the confines of the home. Although historically
the common law imposed upon individuals a duty to retreat until
one’s back was “to the wall” 61 before acting in self-defense, this was
seldom required within the walls of the home.62 By logical necessity,
defense of habitation would lack all practical effect if the same
doctrine affording an individual the right to use force for the preven-
tion of the commission of a felony within his home also required him
to flee from it.63 So, too, the pride of place granted to the privacy of
the personal dwelling has long offered a similar privilege of non-
retreat for the use of force in self-defense.64 Once within the privacy
of his home, English common law considered a man to have entered
an area outside the public domain, and thus as having retreated as
far as the law could reasonably expect.65 And this tradition carried
easily over into early American courts.66 Heller’s recognition of the
“acute” need for self-defense within the home and its commitment
to the protection “of” one’s property within the same render imprac-
tical any expectation that one retreat before effectuating their Second
Amendment right.67 On the one hand, this may seem a relatively
uncontroversial instance of a common law standard leeching into
our constitutional jurisprudence. To this point, the Court long ago
recognized that in the face of imminent danger there is no duty to
retreat.68 On the other, however, this affirms the home as the “moral
nexus between liberty, privacy, and freedom of association.”69 It thus
reifies, perpetuates, and even endorses the problematic tendency for
61. SANFORD H. KADISH ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES: CASES AND MA-
TERIALS 865 (9th ed. 2012) (“The English common law imposed a strict duty to retreat;
a person could use deadly force in self-defense only after exhausting every chance to flee,
when he had his ‘back to the wall.’ ” ).
62. Lydia Zbrzeznj, Note, Florida’s Controversial Gun Policy: Liberally Permitting
Citizens to Arm Themselves and Broadly Recognizing the Right to Act in Self-Defense,
13 FL. COASTAL L. REV. 231, 235 (2012).
63. State v. Blue, 565 S.E.2d 133, 139 (N.C. 2002) (“In neither case [of defense of
habitation and self-defense] is the defendant required to retreat.” ); see also State v.
Miller, 148 S.E.2d 279, 281 (N.C. 1966) (acknowledging that “the law does not require
such householder to flee or to remain in his house until his assailant is upon him, but he
may open his door and shoot his assailant, if such course is apparently necessary for the
protection of himself or family.” ) (quoting State v. Gray, 77 S.E. 833, 833 (N.C. 1913)).
64. See Blue, 565 S.E.2d at 139.
65. Levin, supra note 47, at 530.
66. Id. at 531.
67. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628 (2008).
68. Beard v. United States, 158 U.S. 550 (1895).
69. MARGARET JANE RADIN, REINTERPRETING PROPERTY 56 (1993); D. Benjamin
Barros, Home as a Legal Concept, 46 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 225, 259–76 (2006).
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homeowners to identify themselves with and through their property.
This goes beyond simply affording the privilege of nonretreat in
cases of self-defense by extending the right not merely to one’s body,
but one’s material interests.
B. Necessity and Proportionality in Heller
Heller’s implication that the Second Amendment countenances
a right to armed defense of one’s body and one’s property gestures
toward a situation in which the use of force is a matter of absolute
necessity. For in both cases, defense of habitation or self-defense,
the common law has historically granted a presumption of necessity
within the home.70 Typically, to invoke a defense of necessity, a defen-
dant must demonstrate that the crime committed (a) was to prevent
a significant harm, (b) was without any other adequate legal alter-
native, and that (c) the harm caused was not “disproportionate to the
harm avoided.”71 Whether in defense of self or of property, that Heller
held the Second Amendment to provide for “immediate self-defense”
presumes, perhaps uncontroversially, that a risk to either (a) consti-
tutes a significant harm, and that (b) self-help is the only viable
means for immediate resolution when assailed within the home.72
To talk about one’s right to gun ownership, and perhaps self-defense
with a firearm more generally, post-Heller is thus to speak in the
key of necessity.
For its privileging the register of necessity, Heller collapses the
requirement of proportionality.73 To be sure, not only does a defense
of necessity require the harm caused be proportionate to the harm
avoided, but self-defense has long held the same.74 And this is where
Heller’s reliance on the rationale that informs defense of habitation
becomes problematic. Although we postulate whether a “reasonable
person” would have used x amount of force under circumstances of
self-defense, acting in defense of habitation is not held to the same
70. See Christine Catalfamo, Stand Your Ground: Florida’s Castle Doctrine for the
Twenty-First Century, 4 RUTGERS J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 504, 530 (2007); Pohlman, supra
note 51, at 860.
71. Nelson v. State, 597 P.2d 977, 979 (Alaska 1979) (noting agreement amongst legal
commentators on the “three essential elements” to the defense of necessity); WAYNE R.
LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT JR., HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW § 50 (1972); Edward B.
Arnolds & Norman F. Garland, The Defense of Necessity in Criminal Law: The Right to
Choose the Lesser Evil, 65 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 289, 291–92 (1974).
72. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008).
73. See id. at 576, 597, 619 (discussing necessity).
74. George P. Fletcher, Domination in the Theory of Justification and Excuse, 57 U.
PITT. L. REV. 553, 561 (1996) (describing proportionality as one of three “objective charac-
teristics” of self-defense claims, the others being imminence and necessity).
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standard of reflection.75 Instead of meeting force with force, defense
of habitation meets a perceived felonious violation of one’s home,
regardless of actual threat of death or grievous injury to the body,
with force; “[t]hus, apparently, the harm inflicted may be dispropor-
tionate to the harm threatened.” 76 Either defense, separately or
combined as the Castle Doctrine, may provide for the use of deadly
force, but they also protect the use of lesser force under the same
circumstances.77 Heller, however, ties these common law theories
directly to the use of firearms, which are generally accepted as a tool
intended for deadly force.78 Indeed, many state statutes define deadly
force to include the discharging of a firearm towards another person.79
To the extent that Heller’s justification for individual gun ownership
is buttressed in the rationales of self-defense and defense of habita-
tion, it also implicitly transforms the proportionality requirement of
these protections. It literally “empowers individuals to kill.” 80 Con-
sequently, according to the Heller majority, the Second Amendment’s
right to firearm ownership protects not only force used in the name
of self-defense within one’s home or in the defense of one’s home, but
in particular, it protects deadly force used for such purposes.81
Because the majority in Heller bases the right to own a handgun on
the idea that handguns are the “quintessential self-defense weapon,”
the fact that guns are commonly understood as implements of deadly
75. See People v. Bruggy, 29 P. 26, 27 (Cal. 1892) (describing the standard for reason-
ableness thusly: “The rule in such a case is this: What would a reasonable person,—a
person with ordinary caution, judgment, and observation,—in the position of the defendant,
seeing what he saw, and knowing what he knew, suppose from his situation and his
surroundings?”); V.F. Nourse, Self-Defense and Subjectivity, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 1235,
1246–77 (2001).
76. Stuart P. Green, Castles and Carjackers: Proportionality and the Use of Deadly
Force in Defense of Dwellings and Vehicles, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 9 (1999).
77. See, e.g., LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 71, at § 50.
78. Model Penal Code § 3.11(2) (“Purposely firing a firearm in the direction of another
person or at a vehicle in which another person is believed to be constitutes deadly force.”).
79. Consider, for example, Florida’s legal def inition of deadly force under Chapter
776, section 6 of the Florida Statutes: “(1) [T]he term ‘deadly force’ means force that is
likely to cause death or great bodily harm and includes, but is not limited to: (a) the
firing of a f irearm in the direction of the person to be arrested, even though no intent
exists to kill or inflict great bodily harm . . . .” Id. Cf. N.J.S.A. § 2C:3-11.b (2006) (“Pur-
posely f iring a f irearm in the direction of another person or at a vehicle, building or
structure in which another person is believed to be constitutes deadly force unless the
firearm is loaded with less-lethal ammunition and fired by a law enforcement off icer in
the performance of the officer’s off icial duties.” ); V.T.C.A., Penal Code § 1.07(a)(17)(A)
(defining deadly weapon to include “a f irearm or anything manifestly designed, made,
or adapted for the purpose of inflicting death or serious bodily injury.”).
80. Robin L. West, Tragic Rights: The Rights Critique in the Age of Obama, 53 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 713, 728 (2011).
81. See id.
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force is as fundamental to Heller’s reading of the Second Amend-
ment as is the need for self-defense in the home.82
C. A Man’s Gun Is His Castle?83
It is axiomatic that “[a] constitutional right implies the ability
to have and effectuate that right.” 84 Inherent within the right to
possess tools of deadly force to protect one’s self and one’s home is
the right to use deadly force in order to operationalize that right.
Heller’s language acknowledges as much, creating not merely a
right to own a gun, but an “inherent right” to use it in defense of
“hearth and home.” 85 And in the enterprise of law, no rights are ever
granted “by the constitution for an unlawful or unjustifiable pur-
pose.” 86 Thus, by the Supreme Court granting the right to firearm
possession for self-defense within the home and for defense of the
home, the right to use a firearm to pursue these ends might be pre-
sumptively justified in the face of acute danger. This is not to say,
of course, that an individual is justified prima facie any and every
time they shoot a home intruder. But, as Part III will explore fur-
ther, the fundamental kinship between the Second Amendment and
the Castle Doctrine carves out not only a legal shelter for the use of
deadly force with a firearm, but in doing so relies on conceptual and
spatial terrain over which there is seldom disagreement.87
The linkage that the majority in Heller creates between the
Castle Doctrine and the Second Amendment becomes increasingly
clear from the evidence Justice Scalia provides to reconstruct the
Second Amendment’s central meaning.88 As one commentator notes,
“[t]here is more evidence in the majority opinion establishing the
existence of a common law right of self defense than there is demon-
strating that such a right was constitutionalized by the Second
Amendment’s eighteenth-century ratifiers.” 89 Because the right to
82. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 629 (2008).
83. An earlier version of this argument can be found in Colin Christensen, A Man’s
Gun is His Castle?: Re-Examining the Implications of Incorporating the Second
Amendment, 7 COLUM. UNDERGRAD. L. REV. 50, 50–70 (2013).
84. David I. Caplan & Sue Wimmershoff-Caplan, Postmodernism and the Model Penal
Code v. the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments—and the Castle Privacy Doctrine
in the Twenty-First Century, 73 UMKC L. REV. 1073, 1105 (2005).
85. Heller, 554 U.S. at 628, 635; West, supra note 80, at 728–29 (arguing that Heller
and its progeny, McDonald, grant “a citizen the right to not only purchase and own a hand-
gun but also the fundamental or ‘inherent’ right to use it.” ).
86. Heller, 554 U.S. at 612 (citing United States v. Sheldon, in 5 Transactions of the
Supreme Court of the Territory of Michigan 337, 346 (W. Blume ed. 1940)).
87. Miller, supra note 41, at 1350.
88. See, e.g., Heller, 554 U.S. at 580–85.
89. Siegel, supra note 31, at 1415.
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armed defense posited in Heller stands on fundamental common law
ideas, the Court not only creates a powerful association between the
Second Amendment and the common law, but also suggests an in-
herent sameness between the two by employing language identical
in rationale and effect to these specific common law theories.90 This
specificity raises particularly dubious consequences. Whether one
accepts Heller as good, bad, or somewhere in-between, the constitu-
tional freedom it provides creates a set of peculiar problems for under-
standing self-defense. The right to self-defense is, and always has
been, a right guaranteed to any citizen in the face of present danger.91
To this point many scholars cite Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’s
oft-quoted declaration that “[d]etached reflection cannot be demanded
in the presence of an uplifted knife.” 92 But the right to self-defense
has never been limited or qualified by laws stipulating the specific
tool of force one may use in the face of immediate danger.
Heller complicates this. By codifying the right to self-defense
within Second Amendment doctrine, Heller establishes a unique set
of stipulations that, although they may not necessarily limit the
right to self-defense, nonetheless place those wielding a firearm
under a constitutional shelter not enjoyed by those without.
The rights unique to the Constitution are the most secure legal
shelter within the American scheme of ordered liberty. Heller’s
transposition of common law defenses to constitutional guarantees
of self-help within the home, so long as it is pursued with a firearm,
carries constitutional gravity, whereas self-help pursued with any
other implement of force does not.93 Heller thus disproportionally
disadvantages those who do not possess a firearm by “elevat[ing]
above all other interests the right of law-abiding, responsible citi-
zens to use arms in defense of hearth and home.”94 Likewise, Heller’s
language does not create a right to self-defense categorically, as with
the common law, but a specific variety of self-defense, namely the
Castle Doctrine. Together, the use of common law evidence and the
specific application of and justification for Heller’s reading of the
Second Amendment create an unambiguous kinship between the
authority of the Castle Doctrine and the possession and use of
firearms. Heller thus creates the possibility of a constitutionally
recognized Castle Doctrine defense predicated on the use of a fire-
arm. To be sure, many versions of the Castle Doctrine exist within
90. See, e.g., Heller, 554 U.S. at 594.
91. Joseph H. Beale, Jr., Retreat from a Murderous Assault, 16 HARV. L. REV. 567,
573 (1903).
92. Brown v. United States, 256 U.S. 335, 343 (1921).
93. See id.
94. Heller, 554 U.S. at 652.
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the individual states, each prescribing different requirements for
the use of force and the circumstances under which self-help may be
justified.95 However, with the Court’s decision in McDonald v. City
of Chicago, which incorporated the central holding in Heller against
the individual states, Heller’s reasoning sets a constitutional base-
line for Castle Doctrine defenses.96 Indeed, as Heller constructs the
Second Amendment for the “defense of self, family, and property”
and for the “defense of hearth and home,” the Castle defense rec-
ognized by this constitutional doctrine would: (a) only guarantee
protection if the actor used a firearm in his application of force;
(b) necessarily justify the use of deadly force by virtue of the fire-
arm’s understood purpose; (c) justify the use of deadly force in the
defense of self and of other persons; and (d) justify the use of deadly
force in the defense of one’s dwelling and property therein.97
D. The Castle Doctrine and the “True Man”
Beginning in the late 19th century, the English common law
tradition recognizing the home as the sole place where there was no
duty to retreat began to take on a peculiarly American flavor.98 Al-
though the Blackstonian conception of self-defense within the home
was colored by the notion that one could not be expected to retreat
any further from the public domain once within the privacy of the
home, many American judges rejected the requirement of any duty
to retreat as “contrary to the tendency of the American mind.” 99
This departure from the English tradition was inspired by the
emergence of the “true man” doctrine, an approach to self-defense
which stood for the proposition that a “true man” who is without
fault owes no duty to retreat, even if he could otherwise safely do so,
before resorting to physical force, including deadly force, in thwart-
ing an assailant.100 In many state courts, particularly those in the
American West and South, the “true man” doctrine was recognized
as a legitimate manner of self-defense beyond the walls of the home,
carrying over into any public space in which one had a lawful right
95. See, e.g., Boots et al., supra note 14.
96. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 767–68 (2010).
97. Heller, 570 U.S. at 628, 635.
98. RICHARD MAXWELL BROWN, NO DUTY TO RETREAT: VIOLENCE AND VALUES IN
AMERICAN HISTORY AND SOCIETY 5 (1991). Cf. Levin, supra note 47, at 531 (discussing
American retention of aspects of English common law).
99. BLACKSTONE, supra note 46, at 223 (“[T]he law . . . has so particular and tender
a regard to the immunity of a man’s house, that it stiles [sic] it his castle . . . .” ); BROWN,
supra note 98, at 10.
100. BROWN, supra note 98, at 5–10.
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to be.101 Yet, despite its expansion into the public sphere, the origins
of the “true man” doctrine remain tightly bound within the walls of
the home, rendering the Castle Doctrine the “paradigmatic case for
understanding how the ‘true man’ ought to be expected to behave.”102
The ideology informing the “true man” doctrine thus embedded
within both state castle laws and America’s broader public con-
sciousness normative judgments about the traditional role of and
expectations for men as guardians of hearth and home.103 At the
heart of this ideology is, of course, a conception of manliness, and
thus what it means to be a “man.”104 But this conception of manli-
ness is quite loaded. On one hand, its meaning suggests that the
“true man” is honest and makes decisions based on what he believes
to be true.105 It is in this sense that the “true man” should not be
held to the duty to retreat from his assailant because he presumably
did not provoke the assault.106 On another, however, cultural narra-
tives that implicate classic gender stereotypes also inform this
meaning. Among these, the “true man” protected his wife and chil-
dren who were economically and morally dependent upon him.107
What’s more, as a microcosm of the state, the “true man” protected
not only his household, but so too, his country.108 In this sense, the
“true man” was a sort of American patriot, who, in protecting his
home, protected the legal rights and fundamental freedoms of the
state.109 The rhetoric of the “true man” doctrine thus valorized the
man’s role as “citizen-protector,” at once defending his home and his
family from murderous assault while simultaneously preserving the
sanctity of the law-abiding citizen.110
101. Id. at 34–35.
102. Levin, supra note 47, at 531.
103. Katelyn E. Keegan, Note, The True Man & the Battered Woman: Prospects for
Gender-Neutral Narratives in Self-Defense Doctrines, 65 HASTINGS L. J. 259, 261 (2013).
104. See, e.g., John M. Kang, Manliness’s Paradox, in MASCULINITIES AND THE LAW
136, 137–38 (Frank Rudy Cooper & Ann C. McGinley eds., 2012).
105. See BROWN, supra note 98, at 10.
106. See id.
107. See Jeannie Suk, The True Woman: Scenes From the Law of Self-Defense, 31
HARV. J. L. & GENDER 237, 244 (2008).
108. See id. at 245.
109. Id.
110. See id. at 244. The term “citizen-protector” is taken here from Jennifer Carlson’s
recent sociological study of gun carrying in Michigan. According to Carlson, the contem-
porary citizen-protector model is meant to capture “the braiding of masculine duty with
moral respectability that moves the use of lethal force from the criminal side of the moral
ledger to the lawful and respectable side.” CARLSON, supra note 24, at 97. Cf. Pamela
Haag, THE GUNNING OF AMERICA 75 (describing gun customers in mid-19th-century
America as “not a soldier but a citizen-defender . . . an individual with a force of some
fifty men, embattled on his home turf.” ).
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Many of the social meanings defining the “true man” doctrine
rely implicitly, and at times explicitly, upon norms of honor and
male virtue.111 The “true man” as citizen-protector evokes normative
values of courage, self-reliance, moral respectability, and chivalry—
each of which being traditionally associated as a distinctly male
virtue.112 If nowhere else, the home represents the archetypal space
in which the “true man” could claim a lawful right to be, and thus
demonstrate such virtues by effectuating his right to defend his
home and protect his family.113 This masculine ideology underpin-
ning the “true man” doctrine creates both a normative guidepost for
“manliness” while concomitantly providing a legal shelter for the
exercise of the same. But it also demonstrates a peculiar shift in
social imperatives. The leap made from the Blackstonian Castle
Doctrine, which permitted self-defense in the home, to the American
“true man” doctrine, which inscribes expectations of action, repre-
sents an important shift from ‘may’ to ‘must.’ Under the traditional
English Castle Doctrine, the citizen ‘may’ defend one’s self when
their back is against the wall; under the “true man” doctrine, how-
ever, the citizen ‘must’ defend one’s self when a certain type of threat
arises. In other words, whereas the Castle Doctrine was historically
concerned with adjudicating whether self-defense was the product
of either acquiescence or defiance of intrusion into bodily and pro-
prietary autonomy, the “true man” doctrine is concerned with
whether men satisfy expectations of an honorable citizen or whether
they instead cravenly decline, when expected to ‘man up.’114
That the Second Amendment appeals substantively to the ideol-
ogy of the “true man” doctrine transcends the symbolic, and impli-
cates the doctrine’s practical effect. In other words, Heller’s language
does more than merely echo the cultural tropes and social meanings
underpinning the “true man” as a legal ideology. Indeed, because
this doctrine departs from the English common law by both legally
normalizing and socially mandating the privilege of nonretreat—
especially within the home—the doctrine’s practical effect serves as
a justification for one’s decision to stand and fight when he is as-
sailed to no fault of his own.115 Moreover, on account of the fact that
the Second Amendment regards the right to own, possess, and use
111. See Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 HARV. L. REV. 413,
456–57 (1999).
112. Id.; see also CARLSON, supra note 24, at 97 (discussing morality, masculinity, and
guns).
113. Suk, supra note 107, at 247.
114. I am indebted to Johann Koehler’s instructive comments for helping me develop
this point.
115. See Suk, supra note 107, at 239.
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for personal defense a firearm—a tool intended primarily for deadly
force—Heller mirrors the Castle Doctrine as justification for the use
of deadly force.116 Not only, then, do the purposes for which one may
own a firearm parallel the rationale and effect of the Castle Doc-
trine, but so too, they reproduce the cultural tropes and social mean-
ings of the “true man” ideology that underpin both.
II. HELLER’S CONSTITUTIONAL NARRATIVE:
A MASCULINE MYSTIQUE
What sets Heller apart, then? Beyond the transposition of com-
mon law rights to Constitutional guarantees, what is the problem?
Very little sets it apart—and this is precisely the problem. The
doctrinal kinship between the Castle Doctrine and Heller’s Second
Amendment is the product of a masculine genealogy. The history here
does not mark a progression from rights-oriented political liberalism
bastardized to masculinist protectionism with legal bite. Or, the
other way around, Heller’s “true man” underpinnings are not an
artifact of the nineteenth century. They animate our contemporary
moment, and Heller is but a flashpoint. Put yet a different way, Heller
is not the culmination of gendered expectations shaping legal author-
ity but the representation of how American law has configured the
right to self-defense with male agency all along. The problem arises
when these normative judgments of and imperatives for masculinity
are positioned within our premier legal doctrine—the Constitution.
Constitutional provisions are more than collectively held or indi-
vidually enjoyed guarantees to certain rights and privileges. Against
the backdrop of American political thought, they are a set of social,
political, and intellectual practices that are at once constituted by
and constitutive of American culture and our shared communal
values.117 Far more than merely a legal instrument, the Constitution
is an integral part of our shared language, community, and cultural
ideals.118 It generates both social and political norms, shapes our
thoughts and practices, and exists simultaneously as a sphere of
legal rules and a larger normative constellation apart from textual
rules of law altogether.119 Thus when considering the social meaning
of the Second Amendment, what’s at stake is not only a justification
116. See infra Part I.D.
117. See JAMES BOYD WHITE, WHEN WORDS LOSE THEIR MEANING: CONSTITUTIONS AND
RECONSTITUTIONS OF LANGUAGE, CHARACTER, AND COMMUNITY 273 (1984).
118. See id.
119. H. JEFFERSON POWELL, A COMMUNITY BUILT ON WORDS: THE CONSTITUTION IN
HISTORY AND POLITICS 207–10 (2002).
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for gun ownership, but a cultural narrative of and ethos for self-
defense more broadly. By embedding within the central purpose of the
Second Amendment the social meaning and legal reality of the “true
man” doctrine, Heller constitutionally galvanizes cultural expectations
for ways of acting, thinking, and feeling about gun ownership predi-
cated upon a peculiarly American imperative for manliness.
A. Second Amendment as Hegemonic Masculinity
To whatever extent the Constitution functions as the American
master narrative by which dominant social and political norms and
expectations are established, it is certainly not the only generative
force behind all normative values or cultural ideals. Indeed, many
of these, though perhaps affixed to and at times reified by, exist
independently of the plain text of the Constitution and the meaning
imparted upon it by judicial fiat. Central among such social forces
that shape and order nearly every aspect of our lives is gender, the
socially constructed collections of “cultural meanings and prescrip-
tions” attached to our biological sex.120 To discuss the “true man”
doctrine as a masculine legal ideology is thus to describe a place in
gender relations—the practices through which men and women ef-
fectuate their identities and the ways in which such practices affect
and are affected by individual experience and shared culture—and
to give it institutional authority.121 But like all other social processes,
gender is a constantly changing collection of meanings.122 Such
meanings are an inherently relational dynamic between ourselves
as both individuals as well as members of a shared community; we
are constantly negotiating the characteristics by which we are dif-
ferentiated, and thus ultimately shaping and reshaping the conceptual
definitions and operational mandates for what it means to be a
“man” or a “woman”—masculine or feminine.123
Although we affix meanings to gender, there is nothing fixed or
natural about them. Gender is, according to Judith Butler, perfor-
mative—our gendered identities are not the source of our conduct
but the product of our practices, discourses, and institutions.124 To
take gender as performative is to deny gender of an inherent sub-
stance.125 Gender as such is thus not a state of being but an act of
120. MICHAEL S. KIMMEL, MANHOOD IN AMERICA: A CULTURAL HISTORY 2 (2d ed. 2006).
121. CONNELL, supra note 23, at 71.
122. See KIMMEL, supra note 120, at 3.
123. Id.
124. See JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE: FEMINISM AND THE SUBVERSION OF
IDENTITY 24–25 (1990).
125. Id.
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doing. For, Butler argues, “[t]here is no gender identity behind the
expressions of gender; that identity is performatively constituted by
the very ‘expressions’ that are said to be its results.”126 Importantly,
Butler’s theoretical framework is buttressed in the discursive,
meaning that performativity is an act of linguistic signification by
which we participate in discourse that repetitiously speaks, de-
scribes, and identifies.127 It is this repetition that sets up the fluidity
of gender; in signifying our gendered identities through discursive
performance we are able to make subtle changes to each iteration
and reiteration, altering as we go the meanings affixed to our per-
formed identities.128 In this sense, what we mean by terms such as
“masculine” or “feminine” is “unfixed and unfixable”—their referents
are displaced to some degree or another with every variation in the
repetition of their performance.129 To speak of the “true man” is thus
to engage in a discursive performance that signifies the ideal type
of the masculine, to describe the proper actions taken and to be taken
by “real” men. But, critically, as I take up in Part III, participating
in this discursive performance through legal speech, and constitu-
tional discourse in particular, presents an interruption to the “orbit
of the compulsion to repeat” by virtue of law’s institutional durabil-
ity and often protracted evolution.130 To speak of the “true man
doctrine” is thus to grant manhood a substance, to reify a “ ‘being’
behind [the] doing.”131
By implication, the effect of the early nineteenth century judges
that initially carved out the “true man” doctrine as a legitimate
shelter within the American legal consciousness extended beyond
simply defining a new way of understanding one’s right to self-
defense apart from its Blackstonian heritage.132 It defined what it
meant to be a “true” American man—the most venerable and socially
desirable of men—and enshrined the act of standing one’s ground as
the substance of the same, creating both a legal entitlement and a
social imperative. Although Heller demonstrates that the masculine
126. Id. at 25; cf. FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, ON THE GENEALOGY OF MORALS 45 (Walter
Kaufmann & R.J. Hollingdale trans., 1967) (Butler’s theory of gender performativity is
influenced by Nietzsche’s claim that “there is no ‘being’ behind the doing, effecting, becom-
ing; ‘the doer’ is merely a f iction added to the deed—the deed is everything.”).
127. BERNARD E. HARCOURT, LANGUAGE OF THE GUN: YOUTH, CRIME, AND PUBLIC POLICY
162–63 (2006).
128. Id. at 162.
129. JUDITH BUTLER, EXCITABLE SPEECH: A POLITICS OF THE PERFORMATIVE 14 (1997).
130. BUTLER, supra note 124, at 145.
131. NIETZSCHE, supra note 126, at 45.
132. While scholars like Professor Suk view this effect as translating “the idea of
territorial boundary-crossing into a violation of a person’s rights,” this rights orientation
overlooks the “person” as a discursively constructed, gendered subject. See Suk, supra
note 107, at 245.
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ideology of the “true man” doctrine still deeply captivates the Ameri-
can mind it, along with its nineteenth century counterparts, ignores
the differences between idealized manhood and experienced mascu-
linities as part of an actual lived identity.133 In other words, regard-
less of whether most men view as fundamental to their masculine
identities the ability and willingness to stand and fight in protection
of their personal autonomy and proprietary interests, let alone
whether or not most men ever have or ever will have the chance to
actually do so, Heller creates a particular definition of masculinity
that, by virtue of its place within our constitutional narrative,
stands as the paradigmatic model for masculinity against which
American men are measured.
Sociologists and gender theorists readily acknowledge that the
differences between men render the idea of a unified conception of
masculinity all but impossible.134 Yet, the social reality that there
are multiple masculinities defining men’s actual experiences is in
constant tension with some vision of a singular ideal type of mascu-
linity, what sociologist R.W. Connell seminally termed as “hege-
monic masculinity.”135 For Connell, hegemonic masculinity embodies
the pattern of practices that perpetuate men’s dominance over
women, licensed by institutional authority, cultural ideal types, and
individual exemplars.136 Hegemonic masculinity is not so much
about men’s actual practices as it is the social expectations that
guide their actions.137 Accordingly, hegemonic masculinity has a
subversive, and indeed coercive, quality—defining how “real” men
ought to behave, regardless of the number of men that actually
practice such behaviors.138
Decades before Connell first published her theory of hegemonic
masculinity, prominent social theorist Erving Goffman asserted that
the exemplar of American manhood was “a young, married, white,
urban, northern, heterosexual Protestant father of college educa-
tion, fully employed, of good complexion, weight, and height, and a
recent record in sports.”139 To fail to meet any of these masculine
qualifications, Goffman suggested, is to be viewed as “unworthy,
incomplete, and inferior.”140 Though some of these characteristics
133. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 615–16, 628 (discussing a man’s
duty to protect his home and family).
134. CONNELL, supra note 23, at 76.
135. Id. at 77.
136. Id. at 76–77.
137. See id. at 77.
138. See id.
139. ERVING GOFFMAN, STIGMA: NOTES ON THE MANAGEMENT OF SPOILED IDENTITY 128
(1963).
140. Id.
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may indeed remain active in defining the archetypal American man,
the concept of hegemonic masculinity is not wedded to a static
character type such as the one Goffman describes.141 Rather, hege-
monic masculinity ought to be understood—as contemporary sociolo-
gists widely accept—as the conception of masculinity that occupies
the dominant position within gender relations at a particular moment
in time and place.142 If gender is a product of ongoing social and
performative negotiation, then the hegemonic ideal is simply the
one that is currently winning the day—even if it is up for renegotia-
tion the next.143 Hegemonic masculinity is therefore the product of
a cultural dynamic that legitimates and sustains the dominant
gender practices that define men’s positions in social life, concur-
rently subordinating women categorically, as well as men that do
not fulfill the hegemonic ideal.144
Although the very semantics of the “true man” doctrine point to
a normative judgment regarding manhood in America, the mark of
hegemony “is the successful claim to authority,” which first requires
“some correspondence between cultural ideal and institutional
power.”145 In historical context, that the “true man” doctrine and the
social meanings attached to it became the dominant American
paradigm for justifiable self-defense in both state and federal courts
indicates its hegemony by connecting the cultural ideal of masculin-
ity underpinning the doctrine to the institutional power of the
courts which affirmed the same. And this masculine ideology is
further hegemonized by statutorily defined Castle laws enacted by
individual states, as the Castle Doctrine illuminates the paradig-
matic case for how the “true man” ought to act in the face of danger
within the home.146 Ultimately, then, Heller galvanizes the “true
man” doctrine as a singular hegemonic masculinity—the ideal vision
for manhood in America—by buttressing its social meaning and prac-
tical effect within constitutional doctrine, simultaneously imbuing
its normative judgments of and imperatives for masculinity within
the American master narrative and foremost institutional authority.
Consequently, this vision for manhood is not simply one version
of hegemonic masculinity amongst a multiplicity of masculinities up
for constant and continued discursive renegotiation, but a kind of
supreme hegemonic masculinity suspended in a discursive paralysis
by virtue of our protracted constitutional evolution. Problematically,
141. CONNELL, supra note 23, at 76.
142. See id. at 77.
143. See id.
144. Id. at 77–78.
145. Id. at 77.
146. Levin, supra note 47, at 531.
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this paralysis thus supplies a language of and vocabulary for exercises
of masculinity and expectations for masculine behavior enjoyed by
gun-owning males and denied to their non-gun-owning counterparts.
B. The Illusion of a Feminist Second Amendment
Despite the historicity of the “true man” doctrine being deeply
rooted in ideals of male virtue, perhaps, as some have argued, the
modern understanding of the Second Amendment has little pur-
chase on American manhood, and instead functions to empower
women by legally equipping them with a tool for self-defense that
successfully reduces, if not eliminates, the physical advantages of
their would-be male assailants.147 In this respect, the Second Amend-
ment embodies a certain democratic virtue, offering both equal
access and equal opportunity to successful self-defense.148 Indeed,
many pro-gun activists, male and female alike, employ the rhetori-
cal imagery of a woman fending off a potential rapist with the
handgun guaranteed to her by the Second Amendment to advance
claims to gun rights.149 Among them, Marion Hammer, the first
female president of the National Rifle Association, credits her Colt
pistol as the “equalizer” that prevented her attempted gang rape in
a parking garage.150 Current NRA Executive Vice President, Wayne
LaPierre, has echoed this message proclaiming, “the one thing a
violent rapist deserves to face is a good woman with a gun.”151 Other
pro-gun feminist activist groups argue that the Second Amendment
right to firearm ownership for self-defense within the home en-
hances their ability to protect themselves and their children from
domestic violence and male spousal abuse.152
Intuitively, because the current state of Second Amendment
jurisprudence is bound within the walls of home, the most legally
salient of these feminist perspectives is the argument that gun owner-
ship offers women protection from domestic violence.153 Pragmatically,
147. See Brief of Amicae Curiae 126 Women State Legislators and Academics in Support
of Respondent at 2, District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (No. 07-290) [herein-
after Amicae 126 Women State Legislators] (arguing that the D.C. gun ban impairs wom-
en’s ability to protect themselves and their children against male violence in the home).
148. See id. at 35.
149. Suk, supra note 107, at 266.
150. Merrie Skinner, Pistol-Packing Growing Quickly for Women Alone, NEW ORLEANS
TIMES PICAYUNE, Sept. 9, 1990, at A2.
151. Daniel Blackman, Wayne LaPierre, Gun Salesman, HARV. POL. REV. (Mar. 21,
2013), http://harvardpolitics.com/united-states/wayne-lapierre-gun-salesman/ [https://
perma.cc/A3U2NFJ7].
152. See Amicae 126 Women State Legislators, supra note 147, at 2.
153. See id. (discussing gun rights and violence against women).
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too, this perspective is most salient, as women’s violent confronta-
tions are most likely to involve cohabitants.154 For some scholars,
such as Jeannie Suk and Joshua Dressler, the proposition that the
“true man” doctrine stands as the ideological framework for current
Second Amendment jurisprudence would not reify a masculine
imperative.155 Instead, they maintain that modern self-defense laws,
in particular modern Castle Doctrine statutes, have been reformed
to embrace the female domestic violence victim.156 Even if the Sec-
ond Amendment embraces the common law understanding of the
Castle Doctrine, the contemporary social meaning of the Doctrine,
they suggest, has abandoned its “true man” origins.157 As a result,
it is not only the true man that stands his ground against a murder-
ous intruder, but also the “true woman” who stands her ground
against her violent male cohabitant.158
Yet the Castle Doctrine presents a problematic delicacy for
cases of domestic violence, and particularly those in which a female
co-occupant kills her male counterpart.159 Whereas the historical
origins of the Castle Doctrine speak to a situation in which an in-
truder from without assails one within the privacy of their home,
domestic violence presents a situation of violence between cohabi-
tants.160 Unlike an intruder who has no lawful claim to be in the
home, “the cohabitant shares in the possession of the property and
generally cannot be excluded from it.”161 Consequently, because the
authority of the Castle Doctrine is directed towards instances of
violent intrusion and external threat, a co-occupant killing in self-
defense faces the difficulty that their aggressor enjoys a legal title
to the same space. Thus, although the Castle Doctrine endows the
home dweller with the privilege of nonretreat, many courts have
observed a cohabitant exception, requiring the innocent cohabitant
to retreat from their aggressor.162
The gendered impact of the Castle Doctrine as a legal defense
for the use of deadly force within the home has given rise to two
distinct theories of self-defense that inform its application.163 On the
154. Mary Anne Franks, Real Men Advance, Real Women Retreat: Stand Your Ground,
Battered Women’s Syndrome, and Violence as Male Privilege, 68 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1099,
1108–09 (2014).
155. See Suk, supra note 107, at 240; see also Joshua Dressler, Feminist (or “Feminist”)
Reform of Self-Defense Law: Some Critical Reflections, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 1475, 1479 (2010).
156. Suk, supra note 107, at 240; Dressler, supra note 155, at 1484–85.
157. Suk, supra note 107, at 240.
158. Id. at 257.
159. Franks, supra note 154, at 1111.
160. Id.
161. Carpenter, supra note 60, at 671.
162. Id. at 671.
163. Keegan, supra note 103, at 260.
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one hand is the “true man” doctrine.164 On the other is the Battered
Women’s Syndrome defense, which suggests that an abused female
cohabitant lacks the autonomy to retreat from her repeatedly abu-
sive male counterpart, and because she is subordinated and help-
less, is left with no other option but to kill her abuser.165 According
to Lenore Walker, the syndromatic affect of the battered woman is
the product of a twofold theoretical intersection that explains why
abused women do not “just leave” their abusive situation: “learned
helplessness” and “the cycle theory of violence.”166 For the latter,
violent domestic relationships unfold in three phases beginning with
“tension building,” escalating to an “acute battering incident,” and
culminating with the abuser’s “loving contrition,” which displaces
the battered woman’s desire to just leave under the belief that her
situation will improve.167 As a matter of course, tensions build
again, and round and round the cycle goes. Repeated revolutions of
this cycle over time, according to Walker’s theory, instill in the bat-
tered woman a “learned helplessness” that curtails her motivation
to respond and perceives her attempts to escape her violent situa-
tion as futile.168 Combined, these theories help to explain why bat-
tered women remain in violent relationships by presenting an image
of the female victim whose repeated abuses diminish her “cognitive
capacity to perceive the possibility of success and an inability to
visualize alternatives to the battering relationship.”169
Whereas the “true man” doctrine allows a male to invoke his
masculinity as a justification for his use of deadly force, the battered
woman syndrome is presented as an excusatory defense, tolerable
only because of the mental and emotional impact of repeated abuses.170
This is an important social and legal distinction. Legally, justifica-
tions are objective and general.171 Contrarily, excuses are subjective
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN 43–54, 55–70 (1979); Alafair S.
Burke, Rational Actors, Self-Defense, and Duress: Making Sense, Not Syndromes, Out
of the Battered Woman, 81 N.C. L. REV. 211, 222 (2002) (describing the aspersions cast
on why battered women don’t ‘just leave’ as “one of the most commonly asked questions
about domestic violence.”).
167. WALKER, supra note 166, at 95–96. Cf. Burke, supra note 166, at 221–23.
168. WALKER, supra note 166, at 87–88. Walker’s view of “learned helplessness” bor-
rows from Martin Seligman’s experimentation on caged dogs, which found that dogs
subjected to electric shocks without any escape ultimately ceased trying to escape, even
when provided the opportunity. See also Martin E. P. Seligman, Steven F. Maier, & James
H. Geer, Alleviation of Learned Helplessness in the Dog, 73. J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOL. 256,
256 (1968).
169. Burke, supra note 166, at 224.
170. Keegan, supra note 103, at 261–62.
171. Joshua Dressler, Justifications and Excuses: A Brief Review of the Concepts and
the Literature, 33 WAYNE L. REV. 1155, 1157–67 (1987).
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and individual. The former arise from some sort of natural principle,
the latter from one’s personal characteristics.172 One is a rule, the
other an exception.173 Though both may potentially lead to an ac-
quittal, the former suggests a defendant has done something mor-
ally permissible and socially desirable, while the latter suggests a
defendant has acted in the wrong but, as in the case of the battered
woman, “is so defective in some significant sense that she cannot be
held accountable for her own actions.”174 These are normative judg-
ments with tremendous gravity. By implication, that many state
courts recognize Battered Women’s Syndrome defenses “frequently
sends the legal and social message that women should retreat even
from their own homes in the face of objective, repeated harm to their
bodies”, whereas the “true man” doctrine sends the legal and social
message that men can advance against an assailant on the basis
that they owe no duty to retreat.175 In other words, the private home
presents a space in which men are likely to face violent confronta-
tion from without, whereas women are likely to face violent confron-
tation from within.176 And although men are expected to stand and
fight, women are expected to run and flee.177
The Castle Doctrine’s presumption of reasonableness suggests
that a man can presume that an intruder attempting to enter his
home, whether presenting a real threat of violence or not, intends
to injure him; being a “true man,” he is entitled to use deadly force
against them.178 However, under this same legal defense, a woman
cannot presume that her male cohabitant intends to injure her,
regardless of known abuses or a history of violence, unless he has
unlawfully entered the home.179 As a result, the distinction between
the Castle Doctrine defense based on a “true man” claim and one
based on a Battered Women’s Syndrome claim reifies traditional
gender norms that subordinate and disenfranchise women. The
stark contrast between the evidentiary burdens for each claim re-
veal the social reality of this gendered imbalance, as the “true man”
can testify with his personal account of a deadly confrontation to
demonstrate the imminence and necessity of his use of deadly force,
172. Kent Greenawalt, The Perplexing Borders of Justification and Excuse, 84 COLUM.
L. REV. 1897, 1915–18 (1984) (discussing the moral and legal methods by which justif ica-
tions are distinguished from excuses).
173. Id. at 1900.
174. Franks, supra note 154, at 1122.
175. Id. at 1103.
176. Id. at 1112.
177. Id.
178. See Keegan, supra note 103, at 263.
179. Franks, supra note 154, at 1116.
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whereas a Battered Women’s Syndrome defendant often requires
expert testimony or state-mandated psychological evaluations, and
in some cases even an insanity plea, in order to demonstrate the
same.180
Consider this imbalance in the context of Commonwealth v.
Jody Bradley.181 Mr. Bradley’s defense reduces the fatal encounter
to this: “What happens there is Jody Bradley being in a place he is
allowed to be, his own home, at night, with a hooded figure crouched
down in his attic, at night, hiding . . . Without thinking, Jody fires
the one shot.”182 There is no clear and present danger. There is
literally no thought at all. There is a man in his own home and a
boy lying defenseless on his back.183 But, apparently, this is what
true men do. We can hardly even imagine how this scenario might
have unfolded had Mr. Bradley’s daughter, Sarah, fought back against
her father as he stormed the attic stairs in search of Barker. Mr.
Bradley was a grown man, frustrated by defiant children. Sarah
was a child, terrified by an enraged father with a history of domestic
abuse and armed with a gun.184 Yet, somehow, turning this scenario
on its head presents a more complicated legal issue.
Relying on the recent legal innovations to Florida’s self-defense
statutes as illustrative of a new paradigm for Castle laws, Professor
Suk argues, “the modern Castle Doctrine leverages the subordinated
woman into a general model of self-defense rooted in the imperative
to protect the home and family from attack.”185 According to her
account, the influence of late twentieth-century legal feminism
caused several Castle Doctrine states to recognize the home as a
space of female subordination, treating subordination in the form of
domestic violence as the crime equivocal to the felonious intrusion
within the home for which the Castle Doctrine was envisioned to
provide legal remedy.186 This “new Castle Doctrine,” therefore, takes
as its end the empowerment of women by leveraging the victimiza-
tion of domestic violence as a legally recognized reason to extend the
privilege of nonretreat to cohabitants.187 Yet, as Suk acknowledges,
180. Id. at 1123.
181. Commonwealth of Virginia v. Bradley (Shenandoah Cty. Ct. 2009) (CR09000122-
00).
182. Transcript of Closing Arguments at 521–31, Virginia v. Bradley (2009) (CR09000
122-00).
183. Id.
184. Transcript of Sarah Bradley Testimony at 217, 234, 237 Commonwealth of Virginia
v. Bradley (2009) (CR09000122-00).
185. Suk, supra note 107, at 240.
186. Id. at 252.
187. Id. at 267–68.
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this new iteration of the Castle Doctrine does not license the use of
deadly force in self-defense against a lawful cohabitant unless there
is an injunction for protection from domestic violence against the
cohabitant aggressor.188 Thus, if the cohabitation rule is an excep-
tion to the Castle Doctrine’s privilege of nonretreat, this new provi-
sion is an exception to the exception. However, this also means, in
effect, that women must obtain some sort of acknowledgment of
their domestic abuse from the state before exerting their autonomy
to stand their ground within the home. Inasmuch as the state is a
traditionally and predominately masculine institution—predicated
upon and advancing male dominance—this, too, reinforces the power
men have over women, subordinating a woman’s natural right to
self-help in the face of ongoing danger to male approval by way of
state bureaucracy.189
Though Suk’s argument is appealing, her understanding of the
“new Castle Doctrine” is problematic for several reasons. First, in a
strict legal sense, that the protective order cohabitation exception
in the “new Castle Doctrine” endows the victim of domestic violence
with the privilege of nonretreat is inaccurate. Rarely is a protection
order for domestic violence issued without some form of spatial
restraint attached to it.190 As a result, an individual against whom
a protection order applies is unlikely to occupy the same dwelling as
the victim for whom the order protects. In effect, the protection
order functions not as an exception to the cohabitation exception
under traditional Castle Doctrine law, but as a legal suspension of
the parties’ cohabitant status. Indeed, if the protective order requires
some form of spatial separation, often in the form of an order to va-
cate, then the two parties are not legal cohabiters during the period
in which the order is in effect.191 Curiously, Suk acknowledges this
elsewhere, referring to the spatial restraint accompanying the
protective order for domestic violence as “state-imposed de facto
divorce.”192 Yet, there too, Suk claims that “the matter [protection
from domestic violence] is conceived as a public one concerning the
state, the crime, and the criminal defendant.”193 The “true woman”
188. Id. at 268–69.
189. See CATHERINE MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 161–62
(1989) (claiming “the sees and treats women the way men see and treat women”).
190. Catherine F. Klein & Leslye E. Orloff, Providing Legal Protection for Battered
Women: An Analysis of State Statutes and Case Law, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 801, 931–37
(1993) (demonstrating that 48 states have statutorily provided for the inclusion of a vacate
order with a civil protection order, with two others providing the same bundle of protec-
tions by authority of case law, effectively evicting a respondent from the residence).
191. Franks, supra note 154, at 1114.
192. JEANNIE SUK, AT HOME IN THE LAW 35 (2009).
193. Id. at 45.
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is nowhere to be found in this formulation. The abuser in this case
thus remains identical to the intruder under the traditional under-
standing of the Castle Doctrine, regardless of any claim to cohabita-
tion. What’s more, as other scholars have argued, Suk’s claim that
the protective order exception benefits victims of domestic violence
“assume[s] that protective orders are common, easily obtained, and
timely.”194 In short, this view overlooks a host of sociological factors
that confound the reality of domestic violence victims’ desire and
ability to obtain a protective order.
Second, Suk’s claim that this vision of the new Castle Doctrine
“reinscribes and revises the true man ideal by re-imagining violence
within the home as intrusion”195 both overstates the role of the
protection order and ignores the social meaning of the true man
ideology. Though violence within the home may warrant a protective
order—assuming one is sought—it does not in fact convert violence
in the home to intrusion. To be sure, once the protective order is in
place, either by way of criminal or civil procedure, the terms of the
parties’ cohabitation status are suspended, and therefore intrusion
should be understood no differently than its traditional common law
definition.196 But Suk’s claim that this vision transforms the “true
man” ideal into that of the “true woman” is perhaps most troubling.
Recall that the true man ideology is rooted in the idea that the true
man exercises his autonomy to protect himself, his family, and his
home from violent intrusion, owing no duty to retreat from within
the walls of his own home. Suk’s “true woman,” even if seeking a civil
protection order, which assumes no prior state intervention in her
domestic situation as per a criminal protection order, requires the
victim of domestic violence to seek the state’s approval.197 Whereas
the true man does not need the state’s approval to act in defense of
hearth and home, the autonomy of Suk’s “true woman” is at the will
of an institution outside herself. The imperative that ensues is not
one of true womanhood in the same sense that entitles the true man
to stand his ground and meet force with force, but one that demands
permission from an already masculine institution.198 In either case—
criminal or civil—the trueness of Suk’s “true woman” does not take
194. Id.
195. Suk, supra note 107, at 272.
196. Franks, supra note 154, at 1114.
197. For an example of this state approval, consider the instructions and requirements
to obtain a domestic violence protection order provided by the Oklahoma County clerk’s
office: “Please do not sign your form before presenting it to the court clerk’s off ice. We
must watch you sign the form.” (italics added). See, e.g., VPO Information, OKLAHOMA
COUNTY, http://oklahomacounty.org/courtclerk/VPO.aspx [https://perma.cc/2EVGQF4M]
(last visited Jan. 21, 2017). SUK, supra note 192, at 47 (distinguishing between criminal
and civil protection orders for domestic violence).
198. CONNELL, supra note 23, at 73.
2017] THE “TRUE MAN” AND HIS GUN 511
female autonomy nor agency as its fundament, leaving this figure’s
enfranchisement illusory, not emboldened.199
Feminist arguments, not unlike Suk’s, fall short because they
conflate political sentiment with legal reality. Put a different way,
a feminist Second Amendment imbricates a democratic imaginary
with a criminal legal apparatus that imagines male heroism. Per-
haps there may be a certain democratic sentiment to a feminist argu-
ment in support of the Second Amendment as an individual right.
But this is not Heller’s sentiment. Although on the surface Heller
purports to speak to our democratic sensibilities by its appeal to the
categorical “law-abiding citizen,” the common law on which it relies
and the statutory scheme that puts into operation its practical effect
speak to a character far different. This is not a democratic character,
but a patriarchal one. Heller’s harmful illusion is a right to armed
defense that is politically free but legally male. It expresses not a pre-
occupation with or concern for the public good or civic virtue or social
solidarity, but the individual’s—the true man’s—right to withdraw
from the state and secure himself, his property, and his family with
his gun.200 If any overarching political ethos is to be discerned from
Heller, it is one that professes neither democracy nor republicanism,201
but “bastardized liberalism” of the sort that romanticizes the individ-
ual’s natural, unfettered autonomy, apprehends a condition of con-
stant insecurity, and reserves the right to kill when the position of
either is acutely vulnerable, the reasonability of which adjudged not
by an objective standard but a masculinized one.202
199. To be sure, Suk gestures to this point, arguing that the legal innovations in do-
mestic violence and Castle Doctrine law “present as opportunity for critical reflection on
the increasing subordination of individual autonomy in domestic space to state control
of the home in the name of public interest.” SUK, supra note 192, at 54. Yet, Suk leaves us
with a conflictual account that holds, on the one hand, the expansion of state control—an
expansion inextricably bound up in paternalism and masculinist protectionism—and the
empowerment of female agency, on the other, as coextensive phenomena. Simply put, it
seems there can be one, or the other, but not both.
200. See West, supra note 80, at 743 (arguing that the right provided by the Second
Amendment, and “rights peculiar to the age of Obama” more generally, are “the romantic
individual’s right to withdraw from an utterly incapacitated state.” ).
201. David C. Williams, Civic Republicanism and the Citizen Militia: The Terrifying
Second Amendment, 101 YALE L.J. 551 (1991).
202. Wendy Brown, Comment, Guns, Cowboys, Philadelphia Mayors, and Civic Repub-
licanism: On Sanford Levinson’s The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE L. J.
661, 663 (1989) (describing Levinson’s ‘republican’ argument for the Second Amendment
as an individual right as “not republicanism but a kind of bastardized liberalism, in which
a diff ident and depoliticized populace squares off against the state, in which there is no
political heart at all but only hands and head and feet all armed against one other.”). Cf.
Sanford Levinson, Comment, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE L. J. 637,
648 (1989) (arguing that even in its infancy, America’s founders considered the risk of
tyranny by providing the populace with a way to resist such tyranny).
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C. Heller’s Art of Manliness
1. Navigating Heller’s Paradox
Importantly, the Second Amendment speaks directly to neither
the “true man” nor the “true woman.” Yet, its substantive source of
legitimation is not a democratic political ideal. Rather, its democratic
commitments to the “law-abiding citizen” are a mist that envelops
a system of masculinist power. But how can this be? Simply put,
words don’t always mean what we think they do. Text and practice
are not the same. Often they say one thing, but mean another. They
may even purport to be truth, when the material reality to which they
speak is actually far different. Rhetorical discontinuities present us
with regularity a string of paradoxes. And as these paradoxes grow
in complexity, we all too often cast them away as contradictions—
perhaps as an act of summary dismissal, perhaps as opprobrious
derision. But, as Ludwig Wittgenstein reminds us, even when we
think we understand words, “their meaning lies in their use.” 203
For many in the legal academy, Heller’s glaring contradictions
have proven a reliable source of publishable discussion.204 How is it
that Heller can at once be hailed a “triumph of originalism,” yet
stand as textbook illustration of living constitutionalism?205 To what
extent can we really rely on Heller’s categoricalism206 when its consti-
tutional calculus is a thinly veiled exercise in pragmatism and interest
balancing?207 Is the right to armed self-defense in public really as
historically indeterminate as some suggest?208 Substantively, how
203. LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 197 [68] (G.E.M.
Anscombe, trans., 2001) (For we say that there isn’t any doubt that we understand the
word, and on other hand “[its] meaning lies in [its] use.”).
204. For an excellent survey of the literature on Heller ’s contradictions, see Adam
Winkler, Heller’s Catch-22, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1551, 1551 (2009).
205. See Winkler, supra note 204, at 1557; Linda Greenhouse, 3 Defining Opinions,
N.Y. TIMES (July 13, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/13/weekinreview/13greebox
.html [https://perma.cc/3QXN2YVP]; J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Of Guns, Abortions, and
the Unraveling Rule of Law, 95 VA. L. REV. 253, 256 (2009) (describing Heller as having
“left only originalism as the foundation of conservative jurisprudence.”).
206. Joseph Blocher, Categoricalism and Balancing in First and Second Amendment
Analysis, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 375, 375–76 (2009).
207. Josh Blackman, The Constitutionality of Social Cost, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
951, 973–78 (2011) (arguing Heller ’s logic is bound up in a framework of “concerns about
the social costs of the Second Amendment.”).
208. See Jonathan Meltzer, Open Carry for All: Heller and Our Nineteenth-Century
Second Amendment, 123 YALE L. J. 1486, 1490 (arguing that Heller ’s historical sources
compel a right to self-defense beyond the home); Miller, supra note 41, at 1321 (arguing
that “[t]he history of the right to public self-defense generally, and the Second Amend-
ment in particular, is conflicted and fragmented.”); Winkler, supra note 204, at 1570
(noting that of the sources on which the Court relies for its self-defense rationale “none
of them limit that right to the home.”).
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do we square an “inherent” individual right to armed self-defense
with limitations barring certain classes of people from owning a
firearm or the possession of firearms in “sensitive places” or con-
cealed and otherwise public carry or specific types of commercial
sales?209 In short, it is unclear what we should make of a decision
plagued by inconsistencies in its fundamental technique of reasoning,
evidentiary findings, and practical application and implementation.210
The rhetoric of individual rights is often condemned as over-
exaggerated, absolutist and, ultimately, divisive.211 Yet the assertion
of individual rights with steadfast resolution—or even absolutism—
serves an important discursive purpose: it conveys power, or at least
a desire for it, and under the right circumstances it is an intoxicat-
ing, coercive technique of persuasion. But to speak of individual
rights with absoluteness is to advance an illusory vision of the
subject for which the right exists; it is to perpetuate a false, harmful
account of who—and what—we are.212 Rights are never completely
our own, never free from limitation nor immune to exception. Abso-
lutism, however, opens up the space of paradox. It generates the
very possibility of an identical opposite, an internal contradiction,
and in so doing presents us with a challenge to negotiate, not a
problem to resolve.213 How then might we decipher precisely the
209. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626–28 (2008) (“[N]othing in our
opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of
f irearms by felons and the mentally ill . . . .”; also noting the ruling does not strike down
“laws forbidding the carrying of f irearms in sensitive places such as schools and govern-
ment buildings” nor “laws imposing conditions and qualif ications on the commercial sale
of arms.”). See also Joseph Blocher, The Right Not to Keep or Bear Arms, 64 STAN. L.
REV. 1, 16 (2012) (acknowledging that in cases where one may need to resort to self-
defense, Heller “recognizes a right to have and carry guns”); Michael P. O’Shea, The
Right to Defensive Arms After District of Columbia v. Heller, 111 W. VA. L. REV. 349, 377
(2009) (observing Heller ’s own reasoning suggests the Second Amendment “protects a
meaningful right to carry arms regularly for defense.”) (emphasis removed); O’Shea,
supra note 29, at 621–22 (“It is a statistical truth that most violent crimes that can be
lawfully defended against with firearms occur outside the home, not in or near the
home.”); Eugene Volokh, Implementing the Right to Keep and Bear Arms for Self-Defense:
An Analytical Framework and a Research Agenda, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1443, 1515 (2009)
(asserting that “self-defense has to take place wherever the person happens to be.”);
Winkler, supra note 204, at 1569 (noting that “prohibitions on concealed carry also inter-
fere with self-defense.”).
210. For inconsistencies in Heller ’s implementation, see Winkler, supra note 204, at
1565–66 (claiming that as of January 2009, “lower federal courts had decided over seventy-
five different cases challenging gun control laws under the Second Amendment . . . .
Remarkably, not one gun control law has been declared unconstitutional on the basis of
the Second Amendment since Heller.” ).
211. See, e.g., MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL
DISCOURSE 14 (1991); J. Harvie Wilkinson III, The Dual Lives of Rights: The Rhetoric
and Practice of Rights in America, 98 CAL. L. REV. 277, 304 (2010).
212. Wilkinson, supra note 205, at 305.
213. BONNIE HONIG, EMERGENCY POLITICS: PARADOX, LAW, DEMOCRACY 13 (2009).
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illusory subject built into Heller’s language and, importantly, navi-
gate its paradoxes such that the rhetorical efficacy of claims to self-
defense reveal their socially contingent, rather than politically
absolute, character? Although many attempt to correct Heller’s inter-
nal contradictions, at times in favor of a more expansive Second
Amendment, at times not, perhaps they don’t require correction to
discern a unifying ethos.214 Perhaps, like Wittgenstein, we ought to
look for meaning in the ways in which we use Heller’s language in
practice—in how Heller’s appeals to masculinity function not only
as a peculiar cultural narrative but as an art of persuasion, a rhe-
torical flourish with legal significance.215 In other words, rather
than taking up Heller’s logical contradictions for one side or an-
other, we ought to take Heller’s reasoning as bound up in a paradox
with deep social and political richness—to interpret the gulf sepa-
rating Heller’s words from their use, and attend to the ethos they
instantiate through their articulation.216
The subject for whom Heller purportedly speaks is the “law-
abiding, responsible citizen.” 217 Though on the surface this language
parlays a seductively democratic quality, as Part II.B demonstrated,
this is hardly the reality in practice. The masculine ideology inform-
ing both Heller’s subject and the apparatus of criminal law that
enables the Second Amendment’s practical effect—namely, the
Castle Doctrine—never explicitly names itself. Even if a nineteenth-
century “true man” haunts the Amendment’s twenty-first-century
jurisprudence, this masculine specter is rarely, if ever, articulated
as such. Indeed, it would even seem laughable to advance a Castle
defense in court on the explicit grounds that one was standing up for
their manhood. But our words need not speak of “manliness” to be
used in such a way that treats manliness as the substantive source
of legitimation. Aristotle’s tripartite framework for the technical
means of persuasion offers the clearest indication of how this
works.218 For Aristotle’s account in Rhetoric, there are three primary
modes of appeal: ethos, pathos, and logos.219 Whereas the authority
214. See Meltzer, supra note 208, at 1940; Winkler, supra note 204, at 1570.
215. WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 203, at 197.
216. See, e.g., LEFT LEGALISM/LEFT CRITIQUE 432 (Wendy Brown & Janet Halley eds.,
2002) (“How might attention to paradox help formulate a political struggle for rights in
which they are conceived neither as instruments nor as ends, but as articulating through
their instantiation what equality and freedom might consist in that exceeds them?”);
HONIG, supra note 213, at 77 (“Without interpretation, law which is general and broad
can never be applied, implemented, or understood. Without interpretation, law is insensi-
tive to particularity and nuance.”).
217. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008).
218. See ARISTOTLE, RHETORIC 24–25 (W. Rhys Roberts trans., Modern Library 1st ed.
1954).
219. Id.
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of logos is bound to the logic or reason of the argument itself, and
whereas pathos relies on the emotion of and emotive appeals to the
audience, the power of ethos resides in the character and authority
of the speaker.220 For Aristotle, ethos is the most important of the
three, as it “designates the image of self built by the orator in his
speech in order to exert an influence on his audience.”221 It operates on
the register of the conventional, it invokes cultural norms and ideals,
and it creates an image of the speaker that emphasizes his alignment
with collectively held virtues.222 Ethos in this Aristotelian framework
is foremost a speech act.223 It is a discursive act that exercises, that as-
serts truths and demands recognition, and thus constructs a charac-
ter through speech; consequently, it manifests in the speaker “the
virtues most valued by the culture to and for which one speaks.”224
The persuasive capacity of ethos is, however, bound up in a com-
plex set of social relations.225 The authority of the speaker’s character,
no matter how well in tune to dominant cultural values their speech
may be, cannot be dissociated from their social position.226 The clas-
sical Aristotelian conception of ethos is thus interwoven with the
sociological valence provided by Pierre Bourdieu such that “a dis-
course cannot be authoritative unless it is pronounced by the person
legitimated to pronounce it in a legitimate situation.” 227 Aristotle’s
view of ethos as a discursive construction and Bourdieu’s reminder
that the power of discourse depends on institutional positionality,
and therefore authority, are both complementary and reciprocal.228
To understand the power of ethos requires that we be mindful of
both who is speaking, the social position from which they speak, and
the extent to which their speech is built upon collective representa-
tions and cultural models that the audience endows with positive
value.229 And to understand the masculine ethos that Heller endows
with constitutional authority requires that we pay careful attention to
220. Id. (“Of the modes of persuasion furnished by the spoken word there are three
kinds. The first kind depends on the personal character of the speaker [ethos]; the second
on putting the audience into a certain frame of mind [pathos]; the third on the proof, or
apparent proof, provided by the words of the speech itself [logos].” ).
221. Ruth Amossy, Ethos at the Crossroads of Disciplines: Rhetoric, Pragmatics, Soci-
ology, 22 POETICS TODAY 1, 1 (2001).
222. S. Michael Halloran, Aristotle’s Concept of Ethos, or If Not His Somebody Else’s,
1 RHETORIC REV. 58, 60 (1982).
223. See id.
224. Halloran, supra note 222, at 60; see MARIANNE CONSTABLE, OUR WORD IS OUR
BOND: HOW LEGAL SPEECH ACTS 131–40 (2014).
225. Amossy, supra note 221, at 2, 9.
226. Id. at 3.
227. Id. (citing PIERRE BOURDIEU, LANGUAGE AND SYMBOLIC POWER 107 (1991)).
228. Id. at 12.
229. Id. at 6–8.
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the cultural values it embodies and the pragmatic, sociological reality
of those endowed with the legitimate authority to embody them.
Heller’s paradox: a rule without a rule.230 Nowhere in the words
of the Second Amendment is there mention of self-defense or defense
of “hearth and home.” 231 Nowhere does it speak to an “individual
right.” 232 Yet this is precisely the rule the Court created.233 Perhaps
this is because the vast majority of Americans “believe” the Amend-
ment stands for an individual right to own a gun.234 Even if the rule
doesn’t exist within the formal language of the Amendment, “[e]very-
one believes that the rule exists, but, because it doesn’t, it cannot be
repealed or repudiated.” 235 This is, according to Adam Winkler,
Heller’s “catch-22.” 236 That so much ink has been spilt in attempts
to square this rule with some sort of existing statutory schema, in
lieu of challenging the rule’s legitimacy as such, signals that its
authority is not to be found in its words, but somewhere else.237
Indeed, to challenge one’s right to bear arms is to challenge, at least
ostensibly, one’s right to protect themselves, which is wholly unpal-
atable. Of Heller’s many problematics, not one exists outside of this
paradoxical situation. And it is in precisely the tension of this para-
dox that we find the somewhere else. In other words, though the
Second Amendment’s words aren’t what they seem to be, they are
used in a way that is so familiar to us that to give them any other
meaning borders the inconceivable. Their power follows not from
logos, but from ethos; they are granted with almost uncontestable
authority not by virtue of sound logic but because they articulate a
cultural model and instantiate a character that is endowed with
positive value. The paradox of a rule that doesn’t exist in the form
of rules is thus negotiated by a discursive appeal to cultural norms
and collectively held ideals that transcend the formal boundaries of
law and speak to and on behalf of a character peculiar to and vener-
ated by the American mind: the true man and his gun.
Questions pertaining to the proper scope and application of the
Second Amendment are entangled in this same paradox, and they
are engaged in the same negotiative process by which we contest,
230. Winkler, supra note 204.
231. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008); see U.S. CONST. amend.
2 (“A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of
the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”).
232. Id. at 636.
233. Id. at 595, 635.
234. Winkler, supra note 204, at 1559–60 (analogizing Heller ’s decision to Joseph
Heller’s novel, CATCH-22).
235. Id. at 1559.
236. Id. at 1565.
237. See id. at 1566–69 (describing the lack of statutory authority for Heller ’s rule).
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reshape, and construct the meaning of gender. To grapple with the
barriers to Heller’s implementation is to reflect on the practices that
are deemed necessary in order to be a “true man.” To ask where guns
may be legally carried is to demarcate the proper space of masculinity.
To limit what types of persons may legally possess a firearm is to
intentionally emasculate them, perhaps because they are deemed
unworthy of the recognition, perhaps because they are perceived as
already hypermasculine.238 To restrict the sorts of firearms one may
legally possess is to pass normative judgment on the actions re-
quired of real men and to dismiss certain classes of firearms as
unnecessary to them.239 To regulate the commercial sale of arms is
to affirm an economic structure that privileges one class of men at
the expense of others.240 To speak with the ethos animating the
Second Amendment is to instantiate one’s masculinity, to perpetu-
ate the Amendment’s masculine mystique, and to participate in a
false promise and democratic illusion that reifies violence as male
privilege.241 All of this, importantly, legitimates and is legitimated
by a set of institutional structures that position the male figure as
he who is endowed with the authority to ask these questions, and
critically, to determine their answers.
2. Ethos and Legal Performance
Attention to the discursive function of ethos does not resolve
Heller’s paradoxical ruling—but it does maneuver its tensions with
seeming social acceptability, rhetorical palatability, and legal signifi-
cance. Although the masculine ethos instantiated within the Second
238. The border between the masculine and the hypermasculine has important racial
implications, as indeed black men are often perceived as being de facto hypermasculine
by virtue of their existential blackness—a form of stereotype threat that only grows more
problematic—and more dangerous—with the presences of f irearms. See, e.g., Devon W.
Carbado, Masculinity by Law, in MASCULINITIES AND THE LAW 51–77 (Ann C. McGinley
& Frank Rudy Cooper eds., 2012) (arguing that Black and Latino males must demon-
strate “surplus compliance” to mitigate fears of their perceived hypermasculinity). Burkett,
supra note 25, at 58 (describing the Second Amendment’s history of racial oppression).
239. See, e.g., Kolbe v. Hogan, 849 F.3d 114, 137 (4th Cir. 2017) (holding that the Second
Amendment does not extend to assault rifles and high-capacity magazines: “Whatever
their potential uses—including self-defense—the AR-15, other assault weapons, and large-
capacity magazines prohibited by the FSA are unquestionably most useful in military
service. That is, the banned assault weapons are designed to kill or disable the enemy
on the battlefield”) (citations and quotations omitted). In this context, we might read
this to distinguish the true man envisioned by Heller—the citizen-protector—from a sort
of hypermasculine citizen-warrior that would ensue from allowing constitutional access
to assault weapons.
240. See CARLSON, supra note 24, at 54–56 (observing that there is an inextricable link
between gun ownership and one’s f inancial situation in a period of neoliberal economic
decline).
241. Franks, supra note 154, at 1099.
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Amendment’s newly adjusted valence relies on gendered assumptions
that essentialize otherwise performative and socially constructed
expectations for masculinity, it also galvanizes the persuasive power
of the masculine character it speaks to and for in everyday legal
practice. Though gender is performed in the courtroom as much as
it is anywhere else, ethos as a discursive construct functions inextri-
cably bound to, yet distinct from, this type of performance.242 Speak-
ing with the ethos of the “true man” advances a set of claims that
confirm one’s performative alignment with expectations for manli-
ness, but only in retrospect. Indeed, the legal speech acts we offer in
court speak of past action.243 Their outcomes perform gender, but so,
too, the process by which ethos is used as a tool of persuasion allows
gender performativity to become a legal performance that has power
over our very freedom. When our performed gender identities enter
the courthouse, legal speech that relies on a fundamentally gendered
ethos, and the legal institutions that embrace the same, allows
masculinity to control situations of life and death. In other words,
the masculine ethos underpinning the Castle Doctrine and animat-
ing our Second Amendment jurisprudence—both of which implicate
rights to kill—thus becomes both a way in which manhood is per-
formed and a way in which we justify its performance. By implica-
tion, Heller ’s masculine ideology forms not merely a problematic
cultural narrative that is troublingly gendered but, so, too, it em-
powers a masculine ethos to dominate everyday legal practice.
Recalling that the rationale and effect of Heller’s language
mirrors those of the Castle Doctrine, it is worth noting that this Doc-
trine, too, represents a tense paradox.244 Indeed, Castle defenses
serve to justify acts of violence that would otherwise be understood as
murder.245 The American Castle Doctrine’s infatuation with “true”
manhood signals, not unlike Heller, the capacity for masculinity as an
ethos to negotiate legal dissonance. Thus, to understand how Heller’s
masculine ethos functions in everyday legal practice, consider its
242. Amossy, supra note 221, at 2.
243. For ARISTOTLE, supra note 218, at 32, there are three different kinds of rhetoric—
political, forensic, and ceremonial—that each refer to three distinct kinds of time:
The political orator is concerned with the future: it is about things to be
done hereafter that he advises, for or against. The party in a case at law is
concerned with the past; one man accuses the other, and the other defends
himself, with reference to things already done. The ceremonial orator is,
properly speaking, concerned with the present, since all men praise or blame
in view of the state of things existing at the time, though they often f ind it
useful also to recall the past and to make guesses at the future.
(Emphasis added.)
244. See discussion, supra Section I.B–II.C.
245. Sharfstein, supra note 40, at 639.
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practical legal apparatus—the Castle Doctrine—and the illustration
with which this Article began: Commonwealth v. Jody Bradley.246
Importantly, Mr. Bradley’s claim occupies the same paradoxical
space as the very defense he offers for his actions. Though he shot
an innocent child, Barker, in the head, he also claims that it is he who
is innocent.247 And he advances a castle defense that, too, is predicated
on the paradoxical justification of otherwise unjustifiable violence.248
By way of the “true man” ethos he attempts to maneuver both.
Consider, for instance, the discourse used to frame Mr. Bradley’s
thought process:
‘I am in my house. I’ve got somebody unknown in my house.
Maybe with my daughter. It may not be with my daughter. I
don’t know.’ He arms himself to go up to his own attic. He gets
his own gun, from his own house, to go into another part of his
own house. . . .
What happens there is Jody Bradley being in a place he is al-
lowed to be, his own home, at night, with a hooded figure crouched
down in his attic, at night, hiding himself in a location he has
been barred by law from being. . . Without thinking, Jody fires
the one shot.249
Here, and throughout Mr. Bradley’s closing defense, the “true man”
ideology is the emphatic rhetorical device used to influence the jury.
First, the defense makes perfectly clear that Mr. Bradley was in his
own home—a place where he has a lawful right to be—throughout
the entire course of events precipitating his decision to shoot and
kill Barker.250 What is more, the defense engages and re-engages the
notion of rightful property ownership and thus rightful belonging by
reminding the jury it was his “own gun,” not a friend’s or any other
third party’s gun, and that he was simply moving into another part
of his “own house.”251 Indeed, if the “true man” doctrine is predicated
upon the idea that a “true man” will stand his ground and protect his
home and family, then Mr. Bradley’s defense illustrates that he is
246. Commonwealth of Virginia v. Bradley (Shenandoah Cty. Ct. 2009) (CR09000122-
00).
247. Transcript of Closing Arguments at 521–31, Virginia v. Bradley (2009) (CR09000
122-00).
248. See Bradley’s Murder Trial Begins in Shenandoah County, WHSV (Aug. 18, 2009),
http://www.whsv.com/home/headlines/53598307.html [https://perma.cc/Q2VNN5VM].
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doing exactly that. And because Mr. Bradley presumably did noth-
ing to provoke an intruder to darken the threshold of his home, then,
too, he was in a place he was legally entitled to be and honestly
investigating the perceived threat to his home and to his daughter.
But in addition to casting Mr. Bradley’s actions in the context
of the “true man”—both in the sense that a true man does not
retreat in the face of danger, as indeed Mr. Bradley did not call upon
the police but exercised his prerogative to use private force, and in
the sense that he was doing what any honest, rational, and true
man would—the defense also invokes his role as a father.252 It is in
this context also that Mr. Bradley’s defense illustrates, the stereo-
typical gender norms embedded in the “true man” ideology. If the
“true man” does whatever is necessary to protect his wife and chil-
dren who, importantly, are understood to be dependent upon him,
then to the extent that the defense suggests Mr. Bradley was acting
to protect his daughter, his actions fulfill his proper role as father
and protector, especially as he was defending her within the walls
of the home that he provided. As a result, Mr. Bradley was not
acting to protect merely himself, but his daughter and the physical
space and sanctity of his home. If anything, according to his defense,
Mr. Bradley was an exemplar of the manly virtues of courage, self-
reliance, and chivalry—the same characteristics informing the
normative expectations of the paradigmatic “true man.” 253
Just as Mr. Bradley’s castle defense demonstrates the rhetoric
of the “true man” doctrine, and thus how the Castle Doctrine is in
effect the prototypical “true man” case, so too, it animates the ratio-
nale of self-defense within the home upon which the Court has
constructed the Second Amendment. In so animating, it highlights
the cultural norms associated with and evoked by the role of men in
the preservation of hearth and home towards which Heller’s reason-
ing gestures. Recall that Heller constructs the Second Amendment
for the “defense of self, family, and property,” the central meaning
of which “elevates above all other interests the right of law-abiding,
responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home.” 254
Certainly, Mr. Bradley’s narrative appeals to these very interests:
a simple, law-abiding farmer, who acted in defense of himself, his
daughter, and his home. Yet, in appealing to these interests, Mr.
Bradley’s narrative relies on the cultural trope of the “true man”
252. Transcript of Closing Arguments at 521–31, Virginia v. Bradley (2009) (CR09000
122-00).
253. This chivalry becomes particularly perverse when one considers the defense’s
claim: “That shot is not f ired with malice. What it is, it is not f ired with malice, if it is
f ired with anything, it is f ired with love for his daughter.” Id. at 528.
254. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 571, 635 (2008).
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embedded within the social meaning and legal apparatus of the
Castle Doctrine.255 His threefold presentation of self corresponds to
a unified ethos of the masculine shared by Heller. The kinship
between the Castle Doctrine and the Second Amendment thus not
only galvanizes within our constitutional doctrine the historical, social,
and cultural substance of the “true man” ideology but also it creates
the possibility for this ideology to function with constitutional author-
ity by virtue of its discursive power and institutional legitimacy.
In sum, Heller’s categoricalism and absolute rhetoric of individ-
ual rights accomplishes more than just reciting a false, harmful story
of who and what we are as a people. It shifts the normative valence
of our civil rights and liberties such that manliness is endowed with
constitutional authority.
III. AN IMPERATIVE TO KILL: SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION
BEYOND HELLER
Gender is a complex structure of social relations that are al-
ways in flux.256 Dominant ideals of masculinity are nothing more
than particular configurations of practices and expectations that are
subject to an ongoing process that social dynamics define and rede-
fine.257 This social kinesis renders claims to hegemony always con-
testable.258 Although one vision of masculinity may dominate others
in any given situation, space, or moment in time, hegemony remains
part of this continuous social process, and the characteristics that
subordinate or marginalize masculinities that do not fulfill the
hegemonic pattern are not forever fixed.259 Thus, Heller presents a
unique problem for the social dynamics that define masculinity—
both in relation to women and between groups of men—by impart-
ing within our constitutional narrative a particular conception of
masculinity vis-à-vis its embrace of the “true man” doctrine. Though
we may engage regularly in constitutional discourse, making claims
regarding the proper meaning, scope, and application of constitu-
tional provisions, constitutional doctrine changes but gradually, and
often with extended temporal gaps.260 Indeed, Heller and McDonald
notwithstanding, the 1939 case United States v. Miller marks the
255. See Franks, supra note 154, at 1111.
256. CONNELL, supra note 23, at 71–72.
257. Id. at 72.
258. Id. at 76.
259. Id. at 77.
260. See Jack M. Balkin, What Brown Teaches us about Constitutional Theory, 90 VA.
L. REV. 1537, 1574 (2004) (claiming that “constitutional doctrine changes gradually in
response to political mobilizations and countermobilizations”).
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last time the Supreme Court meaningfully grappled with the central
purpose of the Second Amendment.261 As a result of our historically
protracted constitutional evolution, the masculine ideology embed-
ded within current Second Amendment jurisprudence is effectively
immunized from serious social contestation. It is stuck in a sort of
discursive cement. Even if, pace Butler, gender’s discursivity allows
for subtle or even radical redistributions of the meanings we attach
to it, we must be mindful of law’s power to curtail this transfor-
mative capacity.262 For the extent to which law may be a linguistic
medium for discursive liberation, it all too often performs the oppo-
site. And we see this in every encounter with ardent gun rights
activists, or those of the conservative political right more generally;
we need only recall the mantra “from my cold, dead hands!” 263 The
uncompromising absolutism of Second Amendment rights rhetoric
reveals its discursive impregnability. How can we expect to trans-
form the masculine identity, to reverse its oppressive, disenfranchis-
ing and subordinating effects when the cultural dynamics by which
it is transformed are stymied by the legal and political dynamics
that render Heller’s voice within our constitutional narrative, our
collective discursive register, unlikely to change in the near future?
For some, that the social meanings attached to constitutional
doctrine often become deeply embedded within—and indeed form—
our collective public consciousness poses little worry in the wake of
Heller. But for others, the masculine ideology animated by the “true
man” doctrine represents a problematic conception of and ethos for
manhood in America.264 Whether one accepts Heller’s controlling
language as politically and socially desirable or morally repugnant,
it should trouble all of us. By virtue of the fact that the ideology of
the “true man” doctrine is contained within that part of the Consti-
tution pertaining solely to firearms, the hegemonic masculinity cre-
ated by Heller is grounded not merely in the social meanings of the
“true man” but in the physical act of owning a firearm as well. As a
result, men that do not own a firearm can fundamentally not fulfill
the hegemonic pattern and cultural ideal of this “true man.” Men
that do not belong to the class of gun-owning males are thus subor-
dinated within the hierarchy of masculinities, therefore privileging
261. United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939) (holding that the Second Amend-
ment does not protect an individual right).
262. BUTLER, supra note 124, at 148.
263. This, of course, is Charlton Heston’s infamous call to arms in support of the Second
Amendment. Charlton Heston, From My Cold Dead Hands. Long Version, YOUTUBE
(Apr. 26, 2008), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5ju4Gla2odw [https://perma.cc/U9Q6
9N4M].
264. See, e.g., Franks, supra note 154, at 1099.
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gun-owning males as inherently more manly. This effectively reduces
the ideal conception of masculinity in America to an essentialist
character type predicated on gun ownership, muting the cacophony
of social dynamics that define gender in practice. The very idea of
masculinity that ensues is divorced from independent human char-
acteristics and instead implanted in the physical object of the fire-
arm. Although the “true man” ideology may be wedded to the act of
standing one’s ground in the face of danger, this act fails to meet the
hegemonic ideal if not carried out with a firearm. Thus, so long as
the Second Amendment mirrors the ideology of the “true man”
doctrine, both symbolically and in practice, non-gun-owning men
stand to be subordinated by their gun-owning counterparts, to say
nothing of the American woman.
But perhaps most problematic are the social imperatives em-
bedded within Heller’s masculine ideal. To some, Heller’s “right to
kill” signals an era of an “incapacitated state” that entitles its citi-
zens to violence rather than providing for their safety.265 Yet, per-
haps Heller signals a deeper emergency: a crisis of the normative
masculine identity that has found some semblance of stability in the
gun.266 Whatever meaning has been found for masculinity in the
ownership, possession, and use of firearms is coupled with a deeply
troubling set of social mandates; its “true man” underpinning in-
scribes expectations of action, and this imperative fundamentally
shifts the normative valence of Second Amendment jurisprudence.
Recall the historical evolution of the Castle Doctrine in early American
courts illustrates a transition from ‘may’ to ‘must’267—departing from
the Blackstonian understanding that one ‘may’ stand their ground
within the home and embracing the peculiarly American conception
that the true man ‘must’ stand his ground. Heller further entrenches
this imperative. But, in addition, Heller enhances the social mean-
ing and legal reality of this “true man” imperative by virtue of its
substantive focus on defense with a firearm—and because firearms
are necessarily a tool of deadly force, this imperative is remarkably
more controversial.268 Rather than simply an imperative to stand
265. West, supra note 80, at 728, 743.
266. Winkler, supra note 204 (observing that men “look to guns to validate their sense
of masculinity”). Cf. Lisa Hickey, Elliot Rodger and America’s ongoing masculinity crisis,
SALON (May 28, 2014), http://www.salon.com/2014/05/28/elliot_rodger_and_americas_on
going_masculinity_crisis_partner/ [https://perma.cc/SBR85MDY]; Jenny Carlson, Why
men feel the need to carry guns, L.A. TIMES (May 26, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/opin
ion/op-ed/la-oe-carlson-gun-carry-culture-20150526-story.html [https://perma.cc/ANP8
W4RN] (arguing that “the gun rights platform is not just about guns. It’s also about a
crisis of confidence in the American dream.”).
267. See supra Part I.D.
268. See West, supra note 80.
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and protect, it is an imperative to kill. It buttresses a normative
judgment within our cultural narrative mandating that the “true
man” stands in the face of danger and protects himself, his family,
and his home with his firearm.269 In other words, the “true man”
fears neither danger nor the implications of discharging his firearm
towards a home intruder. Whereas the transition from ‘may’ to ‘must’
might have always included the expectation to kill if necessary,
firing a gun at another person includes the expectation that they
will be killed. Ultimately, if the “true man” is both expected to and
justified in using his firearm to shoot a home intruder, then the act
of killing in defense of self, family, and home is both legitimate and
morally acceptable. Killing with a firearm thus becomes both an
imperative for American manhood and a perverse defining feature
of our cultural identity.
CONCLUSION
Over a quarter century has passed since Wendy Brown asked
of the Second Amendment: “Might there be something a bit ‘gendered’
about a formulation of freedom that depicts man, collectively or
individually, securing his autonomy, his woman, and his territory
with a gun . . . ?” 270 This Article answers emphatically in the affir-
mative. But whereas Brown left us to ponder a view of the Second
Amendment that is far from unproblematic, I hope to leave one that
is even more troubling, even more worrisome, and even more cause
for serious social reflection about our shared values, political senti-
ments, and communal identity. For slow though it may be, the Second
Amendment is not the dormant jurisprudence that it used to be. And
as long as it is presented with active legal questions we are given
opportunities to challenge, displace, and redistribute the social
meanings and gendered mandates for which it stands.
Whether the Second Amendment creates a right to armed self-
defense outside of the home has yet to be addressed by the Court.
However, it is clear that the underlying common law tenets of and
categorical basis for Heller’s individual right to self-defense render the
task of operationalizing Heller beyond the walls of the home problem-
atic.271 Perhaps one immediate and particularly concerning implica-
tion of Heller’s reading of the Second Amendment, and McDonald’s
incorporation of the same, is the potential for a constitutionalized
269. Carlson, supra note 266, at 3.
270. Brown, supra note 202, at 663–64.
271. Blocher, supra note 206, at 383 (noting that “[t]he Court’s failure to clearly iden-
tify any such [underlying] values in Heller, or to clarify the conflicts between them, makes
its use of categoricalism particularly problematic.” ).
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Castle Doctrine defense that would be judicially recognized in states
that have not previously statutorily recognized any form of the Castle
Doctrine. To be sure, many states, if not a vast majority, maintain
some form of the Castle Doctrine as a statutory defense.272 But others,
such as Virginia or Vermont, are especially susceptible to this legal
development.273 Ultimately, if the states cannot ban gun ownership
because Heller constitutionalized the major theoretical underpinnings
of the Castle Doctrine through the Second Amendment, then a state
court that fails to recognize a Castle Doctrine defense presented by
a defendant who used a firearm in defense of his “hearth and home”
may run afoul of federally protected constitutional principles.
But because Heller’s reasoning—not unlike the American under-
standing of the Castle Doctrine more generally—appears motivated
by the social meaning and legal reality of the “true man” doctrine,
future Second Amendment jurisprudence may very well find mean-
ingful purchase in the true man’s imperative to stand his ground even
outside the home. In this respect, the “true man” doctrine has long
leveraged the ethos of stand your ground to provide a right to justifi-
able deadly force anywhere one has the lawful right to be. Perhaps
expanding the Second Amendment based on this rationale dimin-
ishes Heller’s masculine supremacy and brings the rhetorical imag-
ery of a woman fending off a violent rapist in a dark alley within
constitutional harbor. Perhaps then the “true man” doctrine really does
become the “true woman” doctrine—or maybe it creates a gender-
neutral doctrine that entrenches the imperative to stand one’s ground
as an emphatically American ethos. Might this be the manifestation
of what we may come to call the “true American” doctrine? Could
this doctrine indirectly incentivize actors to stand their ground in
cases of public confrontation that would otherwise not result in
deadly force? And if so, what will become of the concepts of necessity
and proportionality if the Second Amendment fundamentally pro-
tects the right to carry and use a tool of deadly force in public? Or
perhaps this, too, will accomplish little more than to mask and exac-
erbate the gendered social reality of one’s legal access to violence.274
272. See Boots et al., supra note 14.
273. For instance, Vermont’s statute on justif iable homicide does not stipulate any
spatial or locational “castles” such as the personal dwelling. See 13 V.S.A § 2305 (2016);
the Supreme Court of Virginia recently acknowledged that “when a party assaults a home-
owner in his own home, as in this case, the homeowner has the right to use whatever
force necessary to repel the aggressor.” Hines v. Commonwealth, 791 S.E.2d 563, 564
(Va. 2016) (citing Fortune v. Commonwealth, 112 S.E. 861, 867 (Va. 1922)). Even so,
Virginia’s statutory code makes no mention of a castle doctrine.
274. See Franks, supra note 154, at 1108–16 (arguing that Stand Your Ground laws
not unlike Florida’s are “not for women”).
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These, among many others, are questions that must be raised and
pondered as we wait to see how the Court will apply Heller’s line of
reasoning in future Second Amendment jurisprudence.
In pondering them, however, we must look within ourselves and
reflect deeply on the values we embrace as a matter of political
course versus those we embrace in our social, daily lives. Is it really
the case that Jody Bradley is the paradigmatic image of American
manhood? I suspect not. I suspect we are more likely to revere those
men capable of deescalating would-be violent conflicts for their posi-
tive example, for their manly example, than we are a diffident farmer
who shot his daughter’s boyfriend in the head. We’d do well to inter-
rogate Heller’s translucent interest balancing, and ask ourselves if
the character it prizes as a product of judicial fiat is aligned with the
figures to whom we look as examples of civically engaged, law-abiding
members of our communities. We’d do well to dispel the romanti-
cized frontiersman as the myth that he is and contemplate those
socially male virtues that we venerate independently of violence, and
to disentangle our sentiments toward firearms, who may legitimately
use them and for what purposes, from male protectionism. And we’d
do well to remember the story of Brendon Barker—and the count-
less others who have lost their lives to America’s masculinity crisis.
